Journal of Strategic Management

Thriving Through Turmoil: Adaptive Resilience in the Age of Permacrisis

Dr. John Odhiambo Mudany, Dr. Mildred Anyango Mudany,
Dr. Eng. Patrick Joseph Owuori & Prof. Emmanuel Awuor

ISSN: 2616-8472

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

Thriving Through Turmoil: Adaptive Resilience in the Age of Permacrisis

[1]Dr. John Odhiambo Mudany, PhD, *

Lecturer, United States International University (USIU).

[2]Dr. Mildred Anyango Mudany, PhD.,
Executive Director, Help REACH Africa

[3]Dr. Eng. Patrick Joseph Owuori, PhD.,
Research Fellow, INTI International University, Malaysia

[4]Prof. Emmanuel Awuor, PhD.
Professor, Management University of Africa

***How to cite this article*: Mudany, J. O., Mudany M., A., Owuori P., J. & Awour, E. (2025). Thriving Through Turmoil: Adaptive Resilience in the Age of Permacrisis. *Journal of Strategic Management. Vol* 9(2) pp. 92-133**
https://doi.org/10.53819/81018102t2505

Abstract

The contemporary global landscape is increasingly defined by permacrisis - a sustained condition of overlapping and compounding disruptions, including climate change, pandemics, economic volatility, political fragmentation, and technological upheaval. These interlinked crises expose the limitations of conventional risk management and governance models, demanding a shift from resilience as recovery to resilience as transformation. This paper advances the concept of adaptive resilience as a multidimensional and systemic framework grounded in institutional learning, decentralized decision-making, and inclusive, participatory governance. Methodologically, the study employs a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) to synthesize interdisciplinary evidence on resilience and permacrisis, alongside empirical case studies from the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, climate adaptation in Kenya's arid north, and the 2023 Turkey-Syria earthquake. These cases were selected to examine how adaptive resilience manifests across political, socio-ecological, and institutional domains. The SLR approach enables critical mapping of resilience mechanisms, governance innovations, and structural weaknesses within diverse crisis contexts. The findings identified three interdependent pillars of adaptive resilience: institutional quality, collaborative governance, and social capital. Systems that prioritize transparency, local autonomy, civic trust, and cross-sector coordination consistently demonstrate greater agility and learning capacity in the face of disruption. Conversely, the paper finds that policy paralysis, democratic backsliding, and fragmented governance structures often undermine resilience, especially in fragile or resource-constrained environments. These insights underscore the necessity

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

of rethinking resilience as an anticipatory and context-sensitive process that is both inclusive and systemically integrated. This paper contends that building resilience in the age of permacrisis requires more than institutional endurance-it demands systemic transformation. Adaptive resilience, as conceptualized here, moves beyond the limitations of restoration-based models by positioning resilience as a dynamic process of continuous learning, innovation, and inclusive governance. The findings underscore that effective responses to complex, layered crises depend on the ability of systems to reorganize, integrate diverse knowledge sources, and reconfigure governance architectures in real time. As global challenges intensify, adaptive resilience offers a forward-looking paradigm-one that enables societies not only to withstand disruption, but to thrive through it by fostering institutional agility, democratic participation, and social cohesion. Such a shift is not optional but imperative for achieving sustainable, equitable, and anticipatory governance in a world marked by deepening volatility.

Keywords: *Adaptive Resilience, Permacrisis, Collaborative Governance, Adaptive Capacity, Social Capital*

1. Introduction

The 21st century has ushered in an era of heightened vulnerability and constant systemic shocks, which collectively challenge traditional models of crisis management and governance. This condition, now widely referred to as a "permacrisis," reflects the persistent and overlapping nature of global crises such as pandemics, climate change, economic disruptions, cyber threats, and political instability (Harari, 2022; McKinsey Global Institute, 2023). These crises are not singular or episodic; rather, they reinforce and exacerbate each other, creating compounding effects on already fragile systems. In such a volatile context, resilience - traditionally defined as the capacity to bounce back after a disruption - becomes inadequate. Adaptive resilience emerges as a more robust alternative in addressing the evolving risks and uncertainties inherent in the age of permacrisis. Unlike conventional resilience models that prioritize returning to a previous state of normalcy, adaptive resilience emphasizes the capacity of systems - whether ecological, institutional, or social - to absorb shocks, learn from them, reorganize, and evolve in ways that retain their core functions and values (Folke et al., 2022; Walker, Holling, Carpenter & Kinzig, 2020). This perspective shifts focus from stability to transformation, advocating for proactive rather than reactive strategies in managing crises. As global risks become more complex and interconnected, adaptive resilience provides a framework for understanding and managing systemic change. It calls for the integration of systems thinking, participatory governance, learning mechanisms, and inclusive strategies that empower communities and institutions alike to navigate uncertainty (Chandler, 2023; Pahl-Wostl, Armitage, Bouwen, & Dewulf, 2023). The interconnected nature of permacrisis implies that solutions must be equally multifaceted and adaptive, incorporating knowledge from diverse disciplines and experiences.

This study aimed at exploring the theoretical foundations, practical applications, and policy implications of adaptive resilience in the context of permacrisis. Through a comprehensive analysis of literature, case studies, and current global trends, the study sought to illuminate the pathways through which resilience can be fostered in systems experiencing chronic disruption. In doing so, it contributes to the ongoing discourse on sustainable governance and transformation in an era marked by uncertainty and continuous upheaval.

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

Permacrisis – A Total Disruption?

The term *permacrisis* refers to a prolonged period of instability and insecurity resulting from a succession of crises that overlap and reinforce each other. Originally used in economic and political journalism, the term has gained traction in academia and policy analysis as a conceptual lens for understanding the complex, interwoven crises of the 21st century (Financial Times, 2022; Niblett, 2022). A permacrisis is not a singular catastrophic event but a dynamic condition of sustained disruption involving climate change, pandemics, geopolitical instability, technological disruption, and institutional erosion.

According to Pistor (2023), permacrisis is characterized by "cascading systemic shocks" that challenge existing governance frameworks and reveal deep structural fragilities. The COVID-19 pandemic, for example, not only exposed weaknesses in global health systems but also intensified economic inequalities, supply chain disruptions, and political polarizations (Tooze, 2021). Similarly, the climate emergency has ceased to be an isolated environmental issue and has become a multidimensional crisis affecting food systems, migration, conflict, and governance (IPCC, 2023).

From a systems theory perspective, permacrisis represents a non-linear, interconnected feedback loop in which crisis begets more crisis through institutional failure, loss of public trust, and the erosion of resilience mechanisms (Taleb, 2010; Kaufmann & Heijden, 2023). It aligns with Beck's (1992) "risk society," where modernization processes produce unintended consequences that overwhelm the capacity of traditional institutions to respond.

Permacrisis Disruptions and Manifestations

The roots of the permacrisis can be traced to a convergence of interlinked global events starting in the early 21st century. While earlier periods also experienced sustained crises, what distinguishes the permacrisis era is the simultaneity and persistence of systemic disruptions-economic, geopolitical, environmental, and technological. Events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the global financial meltdown of 2008, and the Arab Spring signaled the breakdown of the post-Cold War international order and heralded a new era of structural instability (Tooze, 2022). These events revealed the limits of liberal market economies and the fragility of the global order, setting the stage for cascading vulnerabilities across systems. The 2008 global financial crisis was especially pivotal, not only because of its economic impact but also due to the erosion of trust in regulatory institutions, banks, and governance frameworks. The global recession that followed exposed deep inequalities in income distribution, labor market deregulation, and weakened social safety nets (World Bank, 2024). The crisis also led to widespread austerity measures, which further strained public services and undermined democratic legitimacy, particularly in Southern Europe. This period gave rise to anti-globalization sentiment and fueled the political capital of nationalist and populist movements (Ghosh et al., 2022).

Post-2008, these economic and political disruptions morphed into chronic instability. Unlike previous crises that were cyclical or sectoral, the current wave is characterized by feedback loops and system-wide vulnerabilities. For instance, geopolitical tensions such as the Syrian war spilled over into Europe as a refugee crisis, which in turn contributed to the Brexit vote and the rise of anti-immigration rhetoric (Judah, 2022). Each disruption became both cause and consequence of the next, demonstrating the recursive nature of permacrisis. This entanglement distinguishes the

permacrisis from historical downturns by its continuous and adaptive disruption across interconnected domains. By the 2020s, the world was already entering a state of polycrisis-where multiple emergencies not only coexist but compound each other. The term permacrisis reflects this evolution into a state of sustained disequilibrium, where uncertainty becomes the norm. The overlapping disruptions do not resolve sequentially but exist in parallel, affecting planning, resource allocation, and global cooperation. As Mazzucato and Collington (2023) argue, without strategic governance reforms and resilient institutions, societies risk becoming permanently reactive, locked in a cycle of managing symptoms rather than root causes.

Political Fragmentation and the Rise of Populism

One of the key manifestations of the permacrisis is the rise of political fragmentation and populism, especially in Western democracies. The growing disillusionment with mainstream political institutions has accelerated the erosion of the liberal democratic order. This has been driven by growing inequalities, failures in state responsiveness, and disinformation ecosystems that have undermined civic trust (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2023). Populist leaders across the globe-from Bolsonaro in Brazil to Orban in Hungary and Trump in the U.S.-have capitalized on these frustrations, presenting themselves as anti-establishment saviors in a system perceived to be broken.

The Brexit referendum in 2016 exemplifies the disintegration of political consensus. Rooted in years of austerity, immigration anxieties, and a perceived loss of sovereignty, Brexit marked a political earthquake that reflected the broader breakdown of globalist narratives (Garton Ash, 2023). Similarly, the January 6th Capitol riot in the U.S. revealed the vulnerability of even the most established democracies to internal democratic backsliding. The ideological center in many democracies has hollowed out, replaced by polarized political identities driven more by culture wars than policy platforms (Krastev & Holmes, 2022). This political instability is not merely an outcome of bad governance but a systemic failure to adapt to complex global challenges. Governments have become increasingly reactive-struggling to maintain legitimacy amid overlapping crises. Moreover, the rise of digital populism and algorithm-driven radicalization on platforms like X (formerly Twitter) and TikTok has accelerated the decline of deliberative democratic processes (Tufekci, 2023). Such platforms create echo chambers that amplify extremism, spreading falsehoods faster than facts and destabilizing the public sphere.

Furthermore, international cooperation has weakened in this fragmented political environment. From the paralysis of the UN Security Council on Ukraine to the breakdown of climate negotiation mechanisms like COP28, the world is witnessing a crisis of multilateralism. Nationalism, protectionism, and sovereignty discourses dominate, undermining coordinated responses to transboundary problems like pandemics and migration. Thus, political fragmentation and populism are not only symptoms but drivers of the permacrisis, locking the global order in cycles of mistrust and inertia.

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

Climate Change and Environmental Collapse

Climate change is both a disruptor and amplifier of the permacrisis. The Earth system is nearing multiple ecological tipping points, and the manifestations of these include prolonged droughts, rising sea levels, and intensified wildfires. The IPCC (2023) reports confirm that current global warming trajectories could push several regions into permanent ecological destabilization. Events such as the record-breaking 2023 Mediterranean wildfires and the 2024 Amazon drought represent the new climate normal: not anomalies, but chronic conditions of systemic failure (UNEP, 2024). What sets climate disruption apart in the permacrisis landscape is its slow onset but irreversible trajectory. Unlike sudden financial shocks, climate breakdown unfolds gradually but with compounding effects. This includes food system insecurity, climate-induced displacement, and the spread of zoonotic diseases. The Horn of Africa drought, which has persisted for five consecutive seasons, has displaced over 20 million people and triggered cross-border tensions over water and grazing rights (UNHCR, 2023). These disruptions create humanitarian emergencies that cascade into political crises.

Moreover, climate inaction is increasingly perceived as a failure of governance and global justice. The "loss and damage" fund at COP28 remains underfunded and politically contested, reflecting the deep North–South divide. The Global South continues to bear the brunt of climate change while contributing the least to global emissions, fueling grievances about ecological imperialism and climate debt (Malm, 2023). These unresolved injustices feed into geopolitical tensions, making climate change not only an environmental issue but a global security threat. In the context of permacrisis, climate change is no longer siloed in environmental discourses but integrated into economic and social vulnerabilities. Insurance markets are retreating from high-risk areas, cities are reconfiguring urban planning under duress, and migration systems are overwhelmed. As Rabkin (2024) notes, climate crises have crossed the threshold into "governability crises," where traditional policy tools are insufficient to restore stability. In this regard, environmental collapse represents one of the most profound and irreversible dimensions of the permacrisis.

Public Health Emergencies and the COVID-19 Legacy

The COVID-19 pandemic was a paradigmatic moment in the unfolding of the permacrisis, acting as a multiplier of existing vulnerabilities and a catalyst for new disruptions. It exposed the limits of global health preparedness, the weaknesses of public health infrastructure, and the socio-economic fragility of even the most developed nations (Kickbusch et al., 2022). From overwhelmed health systems to broken supply chains, the pandemic revealed how interconnected and fragile the globalized world truly is. COVID-19 not only brought immediate health consequences but also long-term societal impacts. The pandemic disrupted education for 1.6 billion learners, increased mental health issues, and deepened social inequalities, especially for marginalized communities and informal workers (ILO, 2023). Furthermore, the economic aftershocks-manifested in inflation, labor shortages, and increased sovereign debt-continue to constrain fiscal and social policy responses. For many developing countries, the post-pandemic recovery remains elusive, reinforcing a "long pandemic" scenario (UNDP, 2024).

Another critical dimension is the erosion of trust in science and public institutions. Vaccine hesitancy, fueled by misinformation and conspiracy theories, demonstrated the vulnerabilities of democratic societies in managing public health. In many cases, pandemic responses were politicized, with mask mandates and lockdowns becoming polarizing issues rather than collective

responsibilities (Gostin & Meier, 2022). This undermined the efficacy of pandemic control measures and prolonged the public health crisis, even in regions with access to advanced health systems. As a long-term manifestation of permacrisis, the pandemic has shifted how societies perceive risk, health, and the role of the state. Issues of biosecurity, surveillance, and health sovereignty have become central to national policy agendas. Governments are now investing heavily in pandemic preparedness, but these efforts are fragmented and underfunded in most regions. The World Health Organization's Pandemic Treaty, still under negotiation, faces resistance from nationalists wary of international oversight (WHO, 2024). Consequently, global health emergencies are not anomalies but structural features of the permacrisis landscape.

Economic Disruptions and Technological Uncertainty

The global economy, already under strain from decades of neoliberal restructuring, has faced persistent shocks that now form a central pillar of the permacrisis condition. The COVID-19 pandemic led to synchronized global recessions and unprecedented supply chain disruptions, revealing the fragility of just-in-time production models (World Bank, 2024). Inflationary pressures surged following the pandemic, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, rising energy costs, and monetary tightening by major central banks. As of 2023, global debt levels have reached record highs, with over 60% of low-income countries in or at risk of debt distress (IMF, 2024). These conditions constrain fiscal policy, deepen inequality, and reduce states' capacity to respond to concurrent crises.

Another crucial dimension of economic disruption is the increasing precarity of labor markets. The rise of platform economies and gig work, accelerated during the pandemic, has led to an erosion of labor rights, social protection, and job security (ILO, 2023). Technological displacement, driven by artificial intelligence, automation, and digitization, has transformed sectors such as retail, logistics, and finance. While some new opportunities have emerged, the net effect has been labor polarization-concentration of wealth and employment at the extremes of the skill spectrum-leaving the middle class increasingly vulnerable (Chui et al., 2023). This fuels political dissatisfaction and populism, further feeding into the permacrisis dynamic. Moreover, the acceleration of financial speculation and the expansion of unregulated digital assets have added a new layer of instability. Cryptocurrencies, while offering potential for decentralized finance, have also created speculative bubbles and regulatory gaps. The collapse of major exchanges like FTX in 2022 signaled the dangers of loosely governed financial innovation (Gensler, 2023). Central banks and financial institutions now face the dual challenge of fostering innovation while preventing systemic risk-a dilemma compounded by geopolitical tensions and technological arms races. These dynamics underscore how economic systems are increasingly exposed to digital vulnerabilities and cyber threats.

Finally, the volatility of the global energy market adds to the economic instability. The weaponization of energy, particularly by Russia during the Ukraine conflict, demonstrated how energy interdependence can be a geopolitical liability (IEA, 2023). The transition to green energy, while critical for climate goals, also introduces transitional economic disruptions-such as stranded assets, job losses in fossil fuel sectors, and geopolitical realignment around rare earth minerals. As Mazzucato and Dibb (2023) argue, managing this transition requires mission-driven state intervention and long-term investment planning-both of which are difficult to sustain amid ongoing crises.

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

Social Dislocation and Migration

Social dislocation-manifested in mass migration, urban instability, and community fragmentation-represents one of the most visible human consequences of the permacrisis. Migration is increasingly driven not only by conflict and poverty but also by climate change and governance failures. According to the IOM (2023), over 110 million people were forcibly displaced by mid-2023, with many lacking access to basic services or legal protections. These population movements place immense strain on urban infrastructure, welfare systems, and political cohesion in both origin and destination countries, often leading to xenophobia and restrictive migration policies.

In many urban centers, the intersection of economic inequality, climate vulnerability, and underinvestment in housing and services has created a crisis of urban disintegration. Cities like Lagos, Jakarta, and Nairobi face pressures from rapid informal urbanization, where populations outstrip available infrastructure, leading to health risks, insecurity, and declining quality of life (UN-Habitat, 2024). In the Global North, the affordability crisis in housing has created new forms of precarity, even among the middle class, contributing to rising homelessness and suburban poverty (OECD, 2023). This urban crisis is not peripheral-it is central to how the permacrisis manifests in the daily lives of citizens. The socio-psychological effects of permacrisis are equally significant. Prolonged exposure to overlapping crises has led to a documented rise in collective anxiety, trauma, and social alienation. Young people, in particular, are experiencing climate anxiety, disillusionment with political systems, and mental health crises at unprecedented rates (WHO, 2023). Education systems have struggled to recover from pandemic disruptions, with learning loss and digital divides exacerbating long-standing educational inequalities (UNESCO, 2023). These trends are deepening intergenerational and class divides, threatening social cohesion and long-term human development.

Compounding this is the politicization of migration and displacement. Far-right and nationalist parties across Europe and North America have instrumentalized migration flows to galvanize support and legitimize illiberal policies. The failure of global compacts-like the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration-to produce binding or enforceable commitments reflects a broader governance failure (IOM, 2023). Consequently, the governance of human mobility remains fragmented, reactive, and crisis-driven, entrenching the conditions of permacrisis in both moral and material terms.

Governance Failures and Policy Paralysis

At the heart of the permacrisis lies a crisis of governance-a breakdown in the capacity of institutions to foresee, manage, and respond to complex global challenges. This is not simply a matter of leadership failure, but a structural issue where existing policy frameworks and bureaucratic architectures are ill-suited for multi-systemic, non-linear crises. Governments are often locked into short-term electoral cycles and risk-averse behavior, leading to policy paralysis in the face of long-term threats such as climate change, digital regulation, or global health (Fukuyama, 2023).

One major dimension of this paralysis is the decline of multilateralism. Institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the World Health Organization are increasingly undermined by national interest, donor dependency, and political fragmentation. For instance, global vaccine equity failed during the COVID-19 pandemic, with COVAX unable to

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

distribute doses equitably due to export restrictions, nationalism, and intellectual property barriers (GAVI, 2023). Similarly, COP28 failed to deliver binding commitments on fossil fuel phase-outs, revealing the impotence of climate diplomacy in the face of fossil fuel lobbying and geopolitical bargaining.

Domestically, many countries are experiencing governance fatigue. Bureaucracies are overwhelmed by the pace and complexity of change, while public trust in government remains at historic lows in both the Global North and South (Edelman Trust Barometer, 2024). Populist and autocratic responses often fill this vacuum-offering simplistic, performative solutions while undermining pluralism, the rule of law, and independent institutions. Countries like Hungary, India, and Turkey illustrate how democracies can become illiberal through gradual legal and institutional erosion under the guise of crisis management (Freedom House, 2024). Lastly, traditional policy instruments such as taxation, monetary policy, and legislation are increasingly insufficient to manage the complexity of the permacrisis. As Mazzucato (2023) argues, transformative change requires "mission-oriented" institutions capable of steering innovation, regulating markets, and coordinating across sectors. However, such strategic governance remains rare. Instead, reactive policymaking, partisan deadlock, and crisis containment dominate the political landscape. Without adaptive and anticipatory governance, societies risk remaining in a loop of policy failure, reactive politics, and deepening crisis.

The manifestations of permacrisis span across multiple domains, each reinforcing the other in a web of mutual amplification. The climate crisis, with its increasing frequency of extreme weather events, has led to resource scarcity, forced migration, and food insecurity-phenomena which in turn exacerbate social unrest and political instability (IPCC, 2023). Geopolitical tensions, notably the Russia–Ukraine war and rising Sino-American antagonism, have disrupted energy markets and triggered inflationary pressures globally (Bremmer, 2023).

Economically, the shift from hyper-globalization to neo-protectionism has fragmented supply chains, increased trade barriers, and contributed to a growing economic nationalism. According to the World Economic Forum (2024), inflation, debt distress, and job market polarization are becoming structural rather than cyclical. These dynamics create an enduring state of economic uncertainty, especially in the Global South, where vulnerabilities to external shocks are more pronounced (UNCTAD, 2024).

Moreover, democratic backsliding and the erosion of public trust in institutions have become endemic. Digital disinformation, populist movements, and algorithmic radicalization have created what Habermas (2022) terms a “post-public sphere,” where consensus-based democratic deliberation is replaced by polarization and epistemic fragmentation. The accumulation of these crises is not additive but exponential, pushing societies toward a tipping point of social and ecological unravelling.

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

2. Contemporary Examples of Permacrisis

COVID-19 Pandemic and Aftershocks

The COVID-19 pandemic marked the beginning of an unprecedented global permacrisis, disrupting not only public health systems but also economies, political structures, and social fabrics. Initially viewed as a public health emergency, it quickly evolved into a complex, multi-sectoral crisis that exposed systemic weaknesses in global preparedness and equity (World Bank, 2021). Countries with underfunded healthcare systems, including many in Africa and Latin America, were disproportionately affected, while wealthier nations also struggled with ICU capacity and supply chain dependencies. The pandemic revealed the fragility of globalization and the risks of economic over-concentration in specific sectors and regions.

Economically, the effects of the pandemic were profound. Lockdowns led to massive job losses, particularly in informal sectors, with the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2022) estimating that nearly 114 million jobs were lost globally in 2020 alone. Small and medium enterprises were severely impacted, while large corporations adapted faster due to digital infrastructures. Global supply chains were disrupted, exposing vulnerabilities in sectors such as semiconductors, food, and medical equipment (OECD, 2021). These disruptions contributed to rising inflation and long-term economic uncertainty, especially in countries lacking economic buffers or sovereign financial support mechanisms.

Social consequences were equally severe. The World Health Organization (2022) reported a 25% increase in global anxiety and depression, attributing this surge to prolonged isolation, uncertainty, and bereavement. Education systems were thrown into chaos, with over 1.6 billion learners affected by school closures at the height of the crisis (UNESCO, 2021). Vulnerable populations-such as the elderly, women, migrants, and low-income families-bore the brunt of the fallout. Digital inequality exacerbated these divides, with access to remote education and telehealth services limited in under-resourced regions. Politically, COVID-19 became a vehicle for state overreach, with governments invoking emergency powers to curtail freedoms and bypass democratic scrutiny (LSE, 2021). While some of these measures were necessary, in countries like Hungary, India, and the Philippines, leaders exploited the crisis to suppress dissent and consolidate power. The pandemic also intensified populist and anti-science rhetoric, undermining trust in institutions and vaccines. These political aftershocks, coupled with social and economic disruptions, have created a long-term environment of instability-an archetypal illustration of permacrisis.

Russia-Ukraine War and Global Instability

The Russia-Ukraine war, which began in February 2022, has been a flashpoint for geopolitical, economic, and humanitarian crises with global implications. Russia's invasion violated international norms and reignited memories of Cold War-era power politics. The war has directly caused over 10 million people to flee their homes, creating the largest refugee crisis in Europe since World War II (UNHCR, 2023). The immediate military conflict has devastated Ukrainian infrastructure and agriculture, while also leading to heavy casualties and economic distress on both sides.

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

Economically, the war disrupted global energy and food markets. Europe, previously dependent on Russian natural gas, was forced to diversify its energy sources, leading to price surges and renewed investments in fossil fuels (IEA, 2023). Russia and Ukraine together accounted for nearly 30% of global wheat exports. With ports like Odesa blockaded or under threat, countries in North Africa and the Middle East faced acute food insecurity, sparking inflation and potential political unrest (UN News, 2022). These commodity shocks added strain to economies already weakened by COVID-19. The war has also catalyzed a broader geopolitical reordering. NATO has been reinvigorated, with countries like Finland and Sweden abandoning decades of neutrality to join the alliance. Meanwhile, China has strengthened its strategic alignment with Russia, raising fears of a new bipolar world order (CSIS, 2023). The conflict has also escalated tensions in East Asia, especially around Taiwan, indicating that regional conflicts are now capable of triggering global reverberations-a defining feature of permacrisis.

Militarization and increased defense spending have diverted resources from development and climate adaptation. Additionally, the weaponization of food and energy supplies by Russia illustrates how traditional power tools are being reconfigured in a globalized world (Brookings, 2023). Cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns linked to the war have further eroded trust in democratic processes and media institutions, even in distant countries. Thus, the Russia-Ukraine war exemplifies how a regional conflict can manifest into a complex, systemic, and enduring global permacrisis.

Climate Emergency

The climate crisis is the most enduring and systemic of all contemporary permacrises. The years 2023 and 2024 were marked by some of the most extreme climate events in recorded history, from unprecedented wildfires in Canada and Greece to record-breaking heatwaves in India and the U.S. Southwest (NASA, 2024). These events illustrate that climate change is no longer a future threat-it is a present reality that is reshaping geographies, economies, and livelihoods in real time. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2023), the current trajectory of emissions makes limiting global warming to 1.5°C increasingly improbable.

Climate disasters are now interlinked with economic and humanitarian crises. Droughts in the Horn of Africa have decimated agriculture and displaced millions, fueling food insecurity and ethnic tensions (UNEP, 2024). Simultaneously, flooding in parts of South Asia and West Africa has led to cholera outbreaks and infrastructure collapse. As ecosystems collapse or migrate, traditional livelihoods-from fishing in the Mekong Delta to pastoralism in Kenya-are becoming untenable, driving rural-urban migration and overburdening cities (WMO, 2023). These cascading effects constitute climate-induced systemic disruption.

What distinguishes the climate emergency as a permacrisis is its interaction with other global challenges. Climate change amplifies poverty, undermines governance, and increases the likelihood of armed conflict over scarce resources (World Bank, 2023). For example, desertification in the Sahel has exacerbated the rise of militant insurgencies, while water stress in Central Asia has become a source of transboundary friction. Additionally, rising sea levels threaten the very existence of small island nations, posing existential risks with limited recourse under current international legal frameworks.

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

Despite widespread awareness, global climate action remains fragmented. COP conferences continue to deliver ambitious rhetoric but limited actionable progress. Wealthy nations have failed to deliver promised climate financing to vulnerable countries, and fossil fuel subsidies persist even as renewable alternatives are viable (IEA, 2023). This governance failure further entrenches climate as a structural, compounding permacrisis-driving home the inadequacy of existing political and economic models to mitigate or adapt effectively.

Cost of Living and Economic Disruptions

The global cost of living crisis, unfolding since 2022, represents a convergence of economic shocks rooted in pandemic recovery, supply chain disruptions, and geopolitical instability. Inflation rates have spiked across both the Global North and South, with countries like Argentina, Turkey, and Kenya witnessing double-digit inflation (IMF, 2023). Fuel and food prices have been particularly volatile, disproportionately affecting low-income populations. The World Bank (2023) notes that over 70 million people fell back into extreme poverty in 2023 due to rising costs. In developed nations, real wages have stagnated despite low unemployment rates, leading to a phenomenon described as the "wage-price disconnect" (OECD, 2024). Housing costs in cities like London, New York, Nairobi, and Johannesburg have become prohibitive for the middle class, let alone the working poor. This has fueled social discontent, strikes, and mass protests, such as the French pension protests and the cost-of-living demonstrations in Nigeria and Pakistan. Governments, in response, have found themselves constrained by debt, inflation, and political pressure.

The crisis is particularly acute in debt-ridden economies. Over 50 developing countries are either in or near debt distress, limiting their fiscal capacity to implement social protections or invest in development (UNCTAD, 2023). IMF structural adjustment programs, reminiscent of the 1980s and 1990s, are re-emerging, often requiring austerity in exchange for debt relief-a politically sensitive and socially destabilizing strategy. The economic divergence between high-income and low-income countries, therefore, continues to widen. More broadly, the current economic model appears ill-equipped to handle the multi-vector shocks of a permacrisis era. Neoliberal orthodoxy-characterized by deregulation, privatization, and global market integration-is being questioned for its failure to provide economic resilience or equity (Stiglitz, 2023). There is growing discourse around alternative models: from universal basic income to doughnut economics and localized economies. The current economic turmoil, thus, is not just cyclical but structural, signifying a deeper transformation-or breakdown-of existing paradigms.

Political Polarization and Democratic Decline

Political polarization has intensified globally, threatening democratic stability and fostering conditions ripe for authoritarianism. The United States, long considered a stable democracy, has seen increasing political division, culminating in the Capitol insurrection on January 6, 2021 (Pew Research Center, 2023). Electoral denialism, gerrymandering, and judicial partisanship have undermined democratic confidence. Similar patterns are emerging in Brazil, India, and Israel, where populist leaders use nationalist rhetoric to sideline institutional checks and balances.

Freedom House (2023) reports that global freedom has declined for the 17th consecutive year, with only 20% of the world's population living in "free" societies. Countries such as Myanmar, Nicaragua, and Tunisia have experienced sharp democratic regressions, while long-term

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

authoritarian states like China and Russia continue to entrench digital surveillance and repression. These developments are not isolated; they interact with disinformation, migration crises, and economic insecurity-conditions that reinforce authoritarian appeal. Digital platforms have both enabled and exacerbated this polarization. Social media algorithms promote echo chambers and spread disinformation at scale, making democratic deliberation increasingly difficult (Carnegie Endowment, 2024). Election manipulation through deepfakes, bot armies, and foreign interference is now common, eroding trust in democratic processes. Additionally, many governments have passed "anti-fake news" laws that are often used to suppress legitimate dissent, demonstrating the double-edged nature of digital governance. Institutional paralysis and declining public trust further hamper democratic resilience. Legislative gridlock, judicial politicization, and declining civic participation undermine the ability of democratic institutions to respond effectively to crises (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). This creates a dangerous feedback loop: as institutions fail, citizens disengage or turn to populist alternatives, which in turn further weakens institutional integrity. Hence, political polarization is not merely a social phenomenon but a systemic permacrisis undermining the foundations of liberal governance globally.

The Actors of Permacrisis

Permacrisis is driven by a convergence of global megatrends: ecological degradation, rising authoritarianism, disinformation, economic inequality, and technological acceleration. Each of these dynamics is not new, but their coalescence in the 21st century has produced a qualitatively different kind of turbulence (World Economic Forum, 2024). Climate change, for instance, exacerbates water scarcity and food insecurity, which in turn contribute to political instability and conflict, particularly in the Global South (UNDP, 2023; Homer-Dixon, 2022).

Technological change also plays a paradoxical role. While it offers tools for resilience and adaptation, such as AI-driven disaster forecasting or digital finance, it also introduces vulnerabilities through surveillance, job displacement, cyber insecurity, and digital divides (Bridle, 2022; Zuboff, 2020). The rise of misinformation and epistemic fragmentation, particularly through social media algorithms, fuels political extremism, undermining democratic resilience and societal cohesion (Sunstein, 2023; Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). In Africa, the permacrisis is reflected in multidimensional governance failures, environmental fragility, and institutional corruption. The Sahel region, for example, is simultaneously experiencing desertification, armed conflict, and state collapse (International Crisis Group, 2024). Kenya, while relatively more stable, faces persistent threats from climate shocks, electoral unrest, economic volatility, and public debt - interlinked challenges that reinforce each other in a permacrisis dynamic (Odhiambo, 2024; Kanyinga & Long, 2023).

Permacrisis and Governance Failure

Governance systems across the world are struggling to cope with the permacrisis era. Traditional bureaucracies and policy instruments, designed for linear and compartmentalized problem-solving, are increasingly overwhelmed by the scale, complexity, and velocity of change (Mazzucato, 2021; Fukuyama, 2022). This mismatch between institutional design and emerging challenges results in a "governance gap" where public trust erodes, populist movements flourish, and the legitimacy of democratic institutions is questioned.

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

In democratic societies, permacrisis often triggers authoritarian backsliding, as citizens seek strongmen leaders who promise quick fixes (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). In autocratic regimes, crises are used as pretexts to curtail civil liberties and entrench power (Freedom House, 2024). The pandemic response in some states revealed these patterns, where emergency powers were used to limit dissent, postpone elections, or clamp down on media freedom (Amnesty International, 2021).

In Kenya and other African nations, governance challenges manifest in corruption, weak institutional capacities, and patron-client politics. These systemic weaknesses reduce the state's ability to anticipate, absorb, and adapt to complex crises (Cheeseman, 2022). For example, the 2022–2023 drought in the Horn of Africa exposed deficiencies in early warning systems and climate adaptation policies, resulting in avoidable humanitarian disasters (FAO, 2023). Institutions - both formal and informal - are critical in mediating how societies respond to crises. In the age of permacrisis, however, institutional inertia and fragmentation hinder effective governance. Traditional models of risk assessment and crisis management are proving inadequate in the face of complex, interdependent, and rapidly evolving threats. As Mazzucato and Collington (2023) argue, neoliberal governance models that emphasize market efficiency over public resilience have left states ill-prepared for systemic shocks.

The erosion of multilateralism is another critical indicator of institutional breakdown. Global responses to COVID-19, climate change negotiations, and refugee crises have been marred by nationalism, lack of coordination, and resource hoarding. The failure of global institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization to manage these crises collectively reflects a legitimacy crisis in international governance (Keohane, 2023). Locally, the state's role is increasingly contested, particularly in fragile democracies and post-conflict societies. State failure to deliver public goods during crises has catalyzed the rise of parallel governance structures, including criminal networks, militia groups, and religious fundamentalists. These actors often fill governance vacuums but also perpetuate cycles of violence and exclusion (Wainaina & Ndung'u, 2024). In such contexts, the permacrisis becomes a breeding ground for deepening social and institutional decay.

3. Coping with Permacrisis: Towards Adaptive Governance

Responding to permacrisis requires more than crisis management; it calls for transformative, adaptive governance that is anticipatory, inclusive, and systemically aware. Adaptive governance emphasizes flexible decision-making, participatory approaches, and feedback mechanisms that enable societies to learn and adjust in the face of uncertainty (Folke et al., 2021; Boyd et al., 2023).

Key to this approach is resilience thinking - the capacity of institutions and communities to absorb shocks, reorganize, and innovate in response to disruption. This includes decentralizing power, fostering local knowledge systems, investing in social capital, and building robust information ecosystems (Walker & Salt, 2020). Countries like Finland and New Zealand have begun experimenting with long-term foresight units, social trust-building, and agile regulatory models, offering glimpses of post-permacrisis governance (OECD, 2023). In the African context, reimagining governance involves integrating indigenous knowledge, enhancing policy coherence, and strengthening civic participation (Turianskyi, 2023). For Kenya, this means rethinking national planning through intergenerational equity, climate-sensitive budgeting, and participatory accountability mechanisms. The 2023 Kenya National Resilience Strategy, while nascent, represents a step toward adaptive systems thinking (GoK, 2023).

While the picture painted by permacrisis is undeniably grim, it also presents a critical juncture for transformation. The emerging field of adaptive resilience emphasizes the capacity of systems not merely to absorb shocks but to reorganize and evolve in the face of adversity (Walker & Salt, 2020; Norris et al., 2023). Adaptive resilience requires polycentric governance models that decentralize decision-making, incorporate diverse knowledge systems, and prioritize ecological and social sustainability over economic growth.

Community-based resilience models, as seen in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, offer important lessons. Initiatives like agroecology, local health cooperatives, and participatory budgeting demonstrate the potential of bottom-up innovations in building social cohesion and ecological balance (Escobar, 2022; Foucault Welles, 2024). These models foreground relationality, care, and co-production as essential elements of resilience in an age of enduring disruptions.

Technological innovation can also play a transformative role, but only if decoupled from extractive capitalist logics. Digital platforms, if governed ethically, can support collective intelligence, disaster preparedness, and decentralized governance. For instance, early warning systems using AI and local data have improved disaster responses in climate-vulnerable regions (UNDP, 2024).

However, true resilience in a permacrisis era requires a shift in worldview-from dominance and exploitation to interdependence and stewardship. This calls for what Moore (2023) describes as a "planetary consciousness," a fundamental reimagining of human-nature relations, ethics, and institutions.

The Need for Resilience Amidst Permacrisis?

The escalating frequency and complexity of global crises have exposed the limitations of existing governance structures, planning paradigms, and crisis response mechanisms. Conventional resilience frameworks, which focus on recovery and stability, often fail to address the underlying systemic vulnerabilities that make societies susceptible to recurring shocks. This inadequacy is particularly evident in the face of permacrisis - a condition characterized by prolonged disruption and constant risk (Ghosh, 2023; World Economic Forum, 2024). In such a context, resilience must evolve to meet the demands of complexity, unpredictability, and interconnected threats.

The lack of adaptive capacity in many institutions, especially in developing countries, exacerbates social inequalities, undermines development goals, and weakens public trust. For instance, the COVID-19 pandemic revealed critical weaknesses in global health systems, supply chains, and governance mechanisms, which were ill-prepared for prolonged crises (OECD, 2023; WHO, 2023). Similarly, climate change-induced disasters continue to overwhelm traditional disaster response frameworks, leading to greater loss and long-term dislocation, particularly among vulnerable populations (IPCC, 2023; UNDRR, 2023).

Despite increasing awareness of these challenges, there remains a gap in the operationalization of adaptive resilience across sectors. Policy responses tend to be fragmented, reactive, and siloed, lacking the integrative and anticipatory qualities needed to address systemic crises (Bahadur & Tanner, 2022; Aitsi-Selmi et al., 2023). Moreover, there is limited research that unpacks the components of adaptive resilience in a way that is actionable and context-specific, particularly in

the Global South, where resource constraints and institutional limitations are more pronounced (UNDP, 2023; FAO, 2024).

This study addresses this gap by critically examining the concept of adaptive resilience within the framework of permacrisis. It investigates how institutions and communities can build capacity for learning, transformation, and foresight, rather than merely coping with disruptions. The aim is to provide a nuanced understanding of resilience that is not only theoretically grounded but also practically relevant for policymakers, development practitioners, and civil society actors.

Adaptive Resilience

Adaptive resilience, by contrast, emphasizes flexibility, improvisation, learning, and transformation in the face of unpredictable shocks (Folke et al., 2021). It is rooted in systems thinking, acknowledging that social-ecological systems are complex and require dynamic responses. Adaptive resilience involves feedback loops, distributed leadership, and the capacity to reconfigure structures and strategies in real-time. During the COVID-19 pandemic, nations like South Korea and Taiwan demonstrated adaptive resilience through swift testing, contact tracing, and real-time policy adjustments based on emerging data (Moon, 2020). In the domain of urban resilience, cities that adopted nature-based solutions and flexible zoning regulations have shown greater capacity to adapt to heatwaves and floods (Ahern, 2011). Moreover, adaptive resilience fosters social innovation and inclusive governance. It values local knowledge, community agency, and collaborative networks, as seen in Indigenous responses to climate crises or grassroots mutual aid during public health emergencies (Berkes & Ross, 2013; Norris et al., 2008). While planned resilience seeks to preserve existing systems, adaptive resilience may call for transformative change-rethinking values, power structures, and development models (Walker & Salt, 2012).

Empirical Evidence: Adaptive Resilience

Permacrisis reshapes the very ontology of risk-from isolated events to complex, networked disruptions that transcend sectors and borders. In this context, resilience must evolve from a defensive concept to a transformative paradigm. Planned and adaptive resilience, when integrated, can underpin a governance model that is anticipatory, responsive, inclusive, and reflexive (IPCC, 2023). Institutions must adopt resilience thinking-recognizing the inevitability of change and investing in the capacity to evolve rather than merely withstand shocks (Folke et al., 2021). This entails multi-scalar coordination (local to global), transdisciplinary research, and reconfigured metrics of success beyond GDP-emphasizing social cohesion, ecological integrity, and adaptive capacity. In practice, this means embedding resilience across policies-from climate action and public health to finance and urban planning. For example, the European Union's 2021 Strategic Foresight Report promotes strategic autonomy, innovation ecosystems, and resilience dashboards to track and adapt to emerging risks (European Commission, 2021). Similarly, the African Union's Agenda 2063 emphasizes integrated resilience strategies across food security, governance, and education in response to cascading challenges (AU, 2022).

Adaptive resilience refers to the capacity of systems-be they social, economic, institutional, or ecological-to absorb, reorganize, and evolve in response to disruptive shocks. Unlike planned resilience, which often relies on predefined recovery pathways, adaptive resilience emphasizes learning, flexibility, and decentralized innovation (Folke et al., 2021). In a permacrisis context-marked by persistent, overlapping disruptions-adaptive resilience offers a strategic shift away from

rigid recovery models toward iterative transformation. This conceptual shift is particularly relevant as traditional risk management frameworks have proven insufficient in the face of cascading global crises.

The permacrisis condition, characterized by sustained systemic volatility, demands resilience mechanisms that not only absorb shocks but also adapt to evolving risks. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, countries with decentralized health governance (e.g., Germany, South Korea) demonstrated greater agility in testing and contact tracing compared to more centralized systems (Kuhlmann et al., 2021). These cases reveal how adaptive resilience operates by leveraging local innovation, rapid feedback loops, and trust in sub-national institutions. Therefore, empirical resilience is less about technical capacity alone and more about institutional adaptability and responsiveness.

Research from socio-ecological systems also underscores the importance of redundancy, diversity, and modularity as attributes of adaptive resilience. Communities with diversified livelihoods-such as those blending agriculture with remittances or small-scale trade-have been better able to withstand shocks like climate-induced droughts and commodity price crashes (Béné et al., 2018). These empirical findings suggest that resilience is strengthened not by optimizing for efficiency, but by allowing room for experimentation and local contingency planning. Adaptive systems are not merely robust-they are dynamic. Thus, empirical literature affirms that adaptive resilience is context-specific, relational, and iterative. It cannot be imposed through top-down directives but must be co-produced with local actors, particularly those traditionally marginalized in decision-making processes. In this regard, participatory governance and inclusive adaptation planning are not simply normative ideals-they are functional necessities in a permacrisis era (IPCC, 2023). The next sections explore concrete examples of how adaptive resilience manifests in various domains, from health and governance to economy and climate response.

Public Health Systems and COVID-19

Empirical evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic provides a clear lens into how adaptive resilience operated in public health systems. South Korea's rapid deployment of digital contact tracing, coupled with public transparency and civic cooperation, enabled it to control infection rates without prolonged national lockdowns (Kim et al., 2021). Similarly, Vietnam employed adaptive learning by incorporating real-time community feedback, altering protocols regularly based on emerging scientific evidence. These responses highlight the value of governance agility and community trust in adaptive public health resilience. Contrastingly, countries that followed rigid pandemic response plans often struggled. The United Kingdom's initial delay in adjusting its strategy to rising case numbers in early 2020, despite mounting evidence, exemplifies the risk of inflexible crisis governance (House of Commons, 2021). Adaptive resilience is shown to be stronger in systems that embrace uncertainty and revise models quickly based on emerging data. It also depends heavily on transparent communication and devolved authority to frontline agencies.

Health systems that incorporated community health workers and localized decision-making-such as in Rwanda and Kerala (India)-demonstrated quicker vaccine rollouts and better management of localized outbreaks (Devi, 2020). These examples underscore the importance of not only having the physical infrastructure in place but also the social and institutional capital required to adapt effectively. Moreover, partnerships between governments and civil society organizations significantly enhanced outreach and compliance. Finally, the pandemic showed that adaptive

resilience must be embedded within broader governance and institutional frameworks. Where there was political will to coordinate across sectors-health, transportation, education-the response was more coherent and effective. This reinforces the finding that adaptive resilience is not sectoral but systemic. The COVID-19 crisis, thus, serves as a compelling empirical case of how adaptive capacity can mitigate the consequences of a prolonged permacrisis if properly institutionalized and resourced.

Climate Resilience in Vulnerable Communities

Empirical studies on climate adaptation reveal how adaptive resilience is unfolding in frontline communities. In Bangladesh, for example, coastal communities have developed floating agriculture systems-locally known as baira farming-that enable food production during floods (Huq et al., 2018). This innovation emerged not from formal planning but from local trial-and-error over decades. It illustrates how adaptive resilience often arises from indigenous knowledge and community experimentation, especially where formal institutions are weak or absent.

In Kenya's arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs), adaptive resilience has been supported by community-based resource management institutions. These groups coordinate the use of water and grazing resources to prevent conflict and reduce ecological pressure (Opiyo et al., 2022). During periods of drought, flexible grazing arrangements and rotational land use have enabled pastoralists to cope with climate variability. These responses are not just reactive-they are structured around historical knowledge systems and evolving inter-clan agreements, making them highly context-sensitive and self-renewing.

The integration of early warning systems and climate information into local decision-making has also enhanced adaptive resilience. In Ethiopia, farmers who accessed seasonal forecasts through farmer field schools adapted planting decisions, leading to increased food security and income (Bruno Soares & Buontempo, 2020). These examples demonstrate how adaptation becomes transformative when communities are empowered with information and agency. However, such successes depend on sustained investments in local institutions and trust between knowledge producers and users.

Importantly, adaptive resilience in climate-vulnerable settings is increasingly threatened by overlapping crises-conflict, displacement, and land degradation. In South Sudan and parts of the Sahel, adaptive mechanisms are being overwhelmed, not due to a lack of local ingenuity, but because of external shocks that outpace coping capacity (FAO, 2023). This reinforces the argument that adaptive resilience must be embedded within broader peace-building, food systems, and land governance reforms. Without addressing structural inequalities, adaptive efforts risk being temporary rather than transformational.

Governance Innovations and Political Adaptability

Empirical cases from political and institutional domains demonstrate how adaptive governance strengthens resilience during permacrises. For instance, Uruguay's participatory budgetary process and decentralized health system enabled rapid resource reallocation during COVID-19, supporting equitable access to care and economic support (IDB, 2021). These mechanisms allowed government responsiveness to local needs, which is a critical attribute of adaptive governance. Political adaptability, in this context, refers to the ability to shift frameworks, policies, and power

arrangements in response to emerging realities. Taiwan is another example where adaptive governance proved vital. Its rapid response to the pandemic-grounded in lessons from SARS-was supported by legal flexibility, digital governance, and civic collaboration (Wang et al., 2020). Importantly, Taiwan's pandemic task force integrated private sector partners, data scientists, and civil society, showing that cross-sectoral collaboration is essential to adaptive capacity. The capacity to coordinate across government tiers and policy domains also enhanced agility.

In cities, adaptive urban governance has emerged in response to climate and economic shocks. The city of Medellín, Colombia, has used iterative urban planning to adapt to migration, violence, and economic downturns-investing in public transport, inclusive housing, and data-driven crime prevention (Davies & Blanco, 2021). These governance approaches focus on resilience as a function of collective problem-solving rather than merely technocratic planning. Adaptive governance here is defined by institutional learning, openness to public input, and willingness to redistribute power. However, not all governance systems are conducive to adaptive resilience. Highly centralized or authoritarian regimes may respond swiftly but often suppress local innovation or dissent, reducing long-term learning and adaptability. Empirical evidence shows that governance systems rooted in transparency, subsidiarity, and co-production of policies are more resilient in permacrisis contexts (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Hence, building adaptive resilience requires not only technical competence but also democratic and inclusive governance structures.

Adaptive Capacity

Adaptive capacity is recognised as a crucial element for mitigating disaster vulnerability and enhancing resilience in conjunction with coping capacity. Although coping capacity is commonly emphasised in disaster risk studies and adaptive capacity in climate change studies, some research in both fields highlights the distinct and significant roles of both concepts.

The literature suggests that adaptive capacity encompasses a suite of long-term capabilities essential for adjusting to both current and future hazards. Studies by Parsons et al. (2021), Welle et al. (2013), Dunford et al. (2015), and Tinch et al. (2015) underscore this orientation, highlighting the importance of strategic planning and flexibility in disaster response. Parsons et al. (2016) define adaptive capacity as a dynamic arrangement of systems and processes that enable communities and institutions to engage in learning, adaptation, and transformational change. Berkes (2007) reinforces this view by asserting that adaptation is not an automatic or predetermined outcome, but is actively shaped by human agency-particularly through the roles played by individuals, leadership structures, and institutions. Thus, adaptive capacity is widely understood to encompass not only institutional and governance capabilities but also elements of social capital (Hulke & Diez, 2020; Gupta et al., 2010; Keskitalo et al., 2011; Parsons et al., 2021; Pelling et al., 2008).

In evaluating adaptive capacity's contribution to disaster resilience, scholars distinguish between institutional quality, collaborative governance, and social capital. Institutional quality refers to the operational effectiveness and trustworthiness of governmental entities, a point emphasized by Barbier and Burgess (2021) and Kasdan (2022). Conversely, collaborative governance pertains to policymaking processes that actively involve both state and non-state actors (Ansell & Gash, 2008), while social capital captures the relational networks and norms within communities that foster collective action (Ndlovu & Msimanga, 2023; Straub et al., 2020). Each of these domains plays a distinct role in disaster response; for example, institutional effectiveness was pivotal in

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

shaping the scope of public health measures during the COVID-19 pandemic (Wang, 2022). Similarly, collaborative frameworks involving governments, NGOs, and intergovernmental bodies enhanced pandemic preparedness in resource-limited settings (Gooding et al., 2022), while social cohesion contributed to public compliance with health mandates (Alfano, 2022; Wu, 2021).

Despite their distinct roles, measurements of adaptive capacity in disaster resilience studies often amalgamate indicators of collaborative governance within broader categories of institutional quality. Such integration, as seen in the works of Melore and Nel (2020) and Parsons et al. (2016, 2021), can obscure critical distinctions. Although non-state actors contribute significantly to disaster risk management (DRM), formal authority and coordination largely remain within the domain of government agencies (Hizbaron, Ruslanjari, & Mardiatno, 2021; Van Well et al., 2018). Furthermore, collaborative governance remains under-theorized in empirical disaster research, with limited exploration of its direct influence on resilience outcomes (Russell et al., 2021). This lack of conceptual clarity limits the capacity of scholars and practitioners to evaluate and harness the distinct contributions of state institutions, collaborative mechanisms, and community networks in building resilient systems. Therefore, a nuanced understanding of adaptive capacity necessitates analytical separation between institutional quality, collaborative governance, and social capital. Such differentiation allows for more precise evaluations of disaster resilience and fosters the development of tailored policy responses. Recognizing these unique domains can guide the design of resilience frameworks that leverage governmental capabilities, facilitate inclusive decision-making, and strengthen community cohesion. By disentangling these interconnected but distinct dimensions, policymakers can formulate resilience strategies that are both adaptive and contextually grounded.

Collaborative Governance

Collaborative governance refers to the structured engagement between state and non-state actors in policy formulation, implementation, and decision-making processes (Ansell & Gash, 2008). This approach is increasingly recognized as essential in disaster contexts where complex, cross-sectoral responses are required. For instance, Kapucu (2014) reflects on the post-Hurricane Katrina recovery and highlights the failures of inter-agency coordination and political infighting, which undermined response effectiveness. These findings underscore the need for both horizontal and vertical collaboration before and after disaster events to ensure that various stakeholders can align their efforts. Demiroz and Hu (2014) further argue that civil society organizations (CSOs) are critical contributors, especially in contexts where governmental resources are stretched thin, making collaborative structures indispensable.

Recent research supports the role of collaboration in enhancing system-wide resilience. A systematic review by Fridell et al. (2020) identifies key institutional factors such as polycentric governance, cross-sector collaboration, and transparency as enablers of health system resilience. South Korea's proactive and decentralized approach to COVID-19 illustrates effective collaborative governance. As Kim et al. (2020) observe, evidence-based decision-making, mobilization of local health professionals, and the active role of municipalities in disaster response were pivotal. NGOs played a central role in supporting vulnerable populations by working closely with government agencies and community organizations, ensuring that the needs of disadvantaged groups were not overlooked (Choi, 2020).

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

The COVID-19 pandemic also reignited debates on governance centralization versus decentralization. While Hegele and Schnabel (2021) advocate for a centralized crisis governance model, Yang (2020) stresses the value of balancing centralized directives with decentralized responsiveness. Empirical studies show that decentralization is associated with improved public health outcomes and fewer disaster-related fatalities (Jiménez-Rubio, 2011; Robalino, Picazo & Voetberg, 2001; Skidmore & Toya, 2013). Decentralized governance systems can formulate more context-specific interventions and improve public accountability (Cavalieri & Ferrante, 2016), thus promoting long-term resilience.

Global collaboration also plays a significant role in bolstering national resilience. International agencies have taken on expanded roles in financing and capacity-building for pandemic preparedness (Bogich et al., 2012). Fridell et al. (2020) advocate for cross-country learning and sectoral cooperation as part of resilience-building. The experience of Nepal during COVID-19 offers a relevant case, where national coordination was supported by global agencies, including the UN-led health cluster, which facilitated access to vaccines, supplies, and international expertise (MoHP, 2022). Despite these successes, evaluating collaborative governance remains challenging due to the lack of standardized indicators. Researchers often use proxy variables like globalization and democracy indices to assess cooperation levels (Guzel, Arslan & Acaravci, 2021; Sabry, 2019; Azam et al., 2021). Given that democratic systems are generally more conducive to power-sharing and inclusive governance (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Rey & Barkdull, 2005; Hirst, 2000), this study adopts the democracy level as a key indicator of collaborative governance.

Social Capital

Social capital is a foundational element of adaptive capacity, fostering collective action, mutual support, and trust-qualities that enhance resilience in disaster-prone contexts (Kapucu, 2012; Paton, 2006; Zukowski, 2014). It is generally conceptualized through dimensions such as trust, norms of reciprocity, and networks that facilitate coordinated action. Paton (2006) posits that the effectiveness of adaptive responses is contingent upon the extent to which civic and public institutions engage and empower communities. High levels of social capital contribute to enhanced cooperation, efficient resource distribution, and public compliance with emergency regulations, making it a vital enabler of disaster risk management (Mayunga, 2007; Aida et al., 2013).

Empirical studies during the COVID-19 pandemic emphasize the role of social capital in fostering altruistic behavior and civic responsibility. Makridis and Wu (2021) highlight how communities with stronger social bonds displayed greater concern for collective welfare, including self-sacrificial behaviors such as mask-wearing and adherence to lockdown measures. Wu (2021) confirms that social capital contributed to higher compliance with government health directives, while Tangcharoensathien et al. (2023) illustrate the importance of volunteerism and collective action in mitigating pandemic impacts. These behaviors, rooted in mutual trust and community solidarity, served as informal governance mechanisms that supported official response efforts.

At the national level, social capital, particularly trust in government institutions, played a crucial role in reducing health impacts and promoting effective public health measures. Varkey et al. (2020) found that social capital was associated with lower infection rates in Asia, while Bartscher et al. (2021) documented a decrease in excess mortality in European countries with higher civic trust. Elgar, Stefaniak, and Wohl (2020) link civic participation and confidence in governance to lower COVID-19 mortality rates. Conversely, distrust in public health authorities has been shown

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

to exacerbate the spread of disease, largely through the proliferation of rumors and misinformation (Suk & Semenza, 2011; Madhav et al., 2017). South Korea's effective information-sharing strategies, which emphasized transparency and credibility, were instrumental in building public trust and mobilizing widespread cooperation (Moon, 2020). To assess social capital across countries, scholars have employed various measurement approaches. Some studies rely on single indicators such as voter turnout (e.g., Varkey et al., 2020), while others utilize composite indices derived from large datasets. The Legatum Prosperity Index and the World Values Survey are commonly used, though the former offers broader coverage. The Legatum Index includes five pillars of social capital-personal and family relationships, social networks, interpersonal and institutional trust, and civic participation-each with multiple sub-indicators largely sourced from the Gallup World Poll (Legatum Institute Foundation, 2020). Such comprehensive indices allow researchers to conduct nuanced cross-country comparisons, revealing the systemic impact of social cohesion on resilience and public health outcomes.

4. Methodology

This study employed a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) approach to examine the evolving nature of permacrisis, identify the key actors involved in such contexts, and explore the mechanisms of coping through adaptive resilience. The SLR method was chosen due to its capacity to synthesize existing empirical evidence in a structured, replicable, and transparent manner (Snyder, 2019). This design is particularly appropriate given the complex, transdisciplinary nature of permacrisis, which intersects political science, climate studies, public health, governance, and resilience scholarship. A systematic review allows the study to map existing empirical findings, critically appraise methodologies used in prior research, and identify knowledge gaps concerning how communities, institutions, and systems adapt under persistent and multi-layered crises (Boell & Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2015).

Cases

Case 1: COVID-19 Pandemic's Impact on Healthcare and Supply Chains

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed deep vulnerabilities in global healthcare infrastructure and supply chains, particularly in how systems responded-or failed to respond-to cascading disruptions. As the virus spread rapidly across borders in early 2020, healthcare systems in Italy, the United States, and Brazil were overwhelmed due to shortages in ICU capacity, ventilators, personal protective equipment, and trained personnel (WHO, 2022). Countries with adaptive health governance, such as South Korea and Germany, demonstrated the capacity to adjust protocols, mobilize resources locally, and deploy rapid diagnostic testing, thus minimizing the need for extensive lockdowns and system paralysis (Kim et al., 2021).

Supply chain disruptions were equally instructive. Just-in-time production models collapsed under pressure as pharmaceutical, food, and technology sectors experienced delays, raw material shortages, and increased costs. Nations with robust domestic manufacturing capacity, like Vietnam and India, demonstrated greater resilience by repurposing industrial facilities to produce essential goods (OECD, 2021). These shifts illustrate how redundancy and diversification-core principles of adaptive resilience-are crucial in mitigating permacrisis risks, especially when global trade is constrained by health or geopolitical shocks. At the institutional level, adaptive resilience was observed in decentralized health systems that allowed local authorities to tailor interventions. In

Canada, provinces adapted lockdowns and vaccination strategies based on regional data, leading to more responsive governance compared to unitary responses elsewhere (Lemieux et al., 2022). Additionally, the pandemic catalyzed digital transformation in health service delivery. Countries like Estonia and Rwanda rapidly scaled telemedicine, showing how adaptive technologies can supplement overstretched systems during emergencies. However, the pandemic also revealed the limits of resilience in politically fragmented or highly unequal societies. In the U.S. and parts of Latin America, misinformation, political polarization, and fragmented governance undermined coordinated responses. This suggests that adaptive resilience is not solely technical or infrastructural-it is deeply embedded in governance cultures, trust networks, and the political economy of crisis response (LSE, 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic thus provides a foundational case for understanding how adaptive resilience must be systemic and inclusive to endure long-term, interconnected disruptions.

Case 2: Ukraine's Resilience During Wartime (2022–Present)

Ukraine's resilience following Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022 presents one of the most compelling real-world examples of adaptive resilience in a prolonged state of permacrisis. Despite facing overwhelming military aggression, Ukraine sustained essential government operations, humanitarian services, and communication infrastructure. Early in the war, the government relocated key ministries, digitized public services via the "Diia" platform, and maintained public access to banking, schooling, and healthcare services-demonstrating remarkable institutional agility (Forbes Ukraine, 2023).

Civic mobilization has been a hallmark of Ukraine's adaptive resilience. Local governments, civil society, and informal volunteer networks filled gaps in aid delivery, military logistics, and refugee support. The country's decentralized administrative structure, developed during earlier reforms, enabled municipalities and oblasts to continue operating autonomously when central channels were under attack (USAID, 2022). This decentralized governance, built on participatory and community-driven mechanisms, has allowed for more targeted and culturally relevant resilience strategies during wartime. Technological adaptation also played a crucial role. Ukraine leveraged satellite internet (e.g., Starlink) to maintain digital infrastructure and deployed open-source intelligence tools for battlefield awareness and humanitarian coordination (Brookings, 2023). The private sector, particularly the IT industry, adapted rapidly to wartime conditions, with tech hubs relocating and continuing to export services remotely. Moreover, Ukraine's education system transitioned to hybrid and remote learning, minimizing the long-term disruption to students, even amid bombings and displacements.

Despite the devastation, Ukraine has used the war as an opportunity for institutional learning and resilience-building. Reconstruction frameworks are being designed to include decentralization, climate adaptation, and anti-corruption safeguards (World Bank, 2023). This future-oriented perspective reflects a shift from reactive to proactive resilience planning. Ukraine's wartime experience affirms that adaptive resilience thrives not only on capacity and resources but also on social cohesion, digital innovation, and multi-scalar governance-all essential under conditions of permacrisis.

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

Case 3: Kenya's Climate-Agriculture-Conflict Nexus in the Arid North

Kenya's arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs), especially in the north (e.g., Turkana, Marsabit, and Garissa), offer a powerful illustration of adaptive resilience amid a climate-agriculture-conflict nexus. These regions have experienced escalating climate variability, marked by recurring droughts, flash floods, and increasing desertification. The prolonged 2020–2023 droughts led to massive livestock deaths and crop failures, undermining pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihoods (FAO, 2023). In response, local communities and NGOs implemented water harvesting, drought-resistant crops, and livestock insurance schemes tailored to nomadic populations.

Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) emerged as a key strategy. For example, the use of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms-such as negotiated grazing corridors and water-sharing arrangements-helped mediate disputes among pastoralist groups (Opiyo et al., 2022). These informal institutions were supported by formal actors like county governments and regional peace councils, enabling multi-level adaptation to resource scarcity. The success of such hybrid models underlines the importance of blending indigenous knowledge with modern governance for sustainable resilience.

The role of adaptive technology has also been notable. Digital platforms such as Kenya's ASAL Early Warning System and mobile apps that provide rainfall forecasts, market prices, and livestock health alerts have enhanced community preparedness (NDMA, 2023). Mobile money (e.g., M-Pesa) has facilitated emergency transfers and helped buffer families from market shocks, thus functioning as a real-time adaptive finance mechanism. These innovations show how technology can bridge the gap between vulnerability and resilience, especially when embedded in local practices.

Nevertheless, systemic fragility remains due to structural marginalization, weak infrastructure, and intermittent security operations. Cross-border raids and the proliferation of small arms-often exacerbated by drought-induced competition-have overwhelmed local capacities. This underlines the critical need for integrated policy approaches that align climate adaptation, conflict prevention, and sustainable development. Kenya's experience in its arid north demonstrates that adaptive resilience is possible, but only through inclusive governance, sustained investment, and attention to socio-political dynamics underpinning resource conflicts in permacrisis conditions.

Case 4: The 2023 Turkey-Syria Earthquake Under Economic and Political Stress

The 7.8 magnitude earthquake that struck southern Turkey and northern Syria in February 2023 tested the adaptive capacity of two very different governance systems operating under economic and political stress. In Turkey, the disaster exposed institutional fragility within the central government, where accusations of delayed response, corruption in building codes enforcement, and political favoritism dominated the public discourse (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Yet, local municipalities-particularly opposition-led cities like Istanbul and Izmir-mobilized relief faster than national agencies, highlighting the adaptive potential of decentralized response systems.

Civil society in both countries played an essential role in adaptive resilience. In Turkey, thousands of volunteers, NGOs, and professional associations organized rescue operations, temporary shelters, and resource distribution. Crowdsourced platforms and social media were used to track missing persons and damaged buildings, circumventing bureaucratic bottlenecks (ICVA, 2023).

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

In Syria, where governance is fragmented by war, local councils and international NGOs operated under extreme constraints but provided critical aid in rebel-held and Kurdish areas through cross-border humanitarian corridors.

The adaptive response was significantly hampered by political constraints. In Syria, years of conflict had already decimated health infrastructure and governance institutions, making coordination exceedingly difficult. Sanctions, security restrictions, and lack of recognition of non-state actors all delayed the delivery of aid. Adaptive capacity in this case depended heavily on informal networks and international humanitarian actors that had pre-established access and local legitimacy. The disparity in response between areas controlled by different factions also revealed the political dimensions of resilience in contested governance spaces.

The Turkey-Syria earthquake reinforces the notion that adaptive resilience is not only about material capabilities but also about institutional flexibility, civic space, and cross-border cooperation. Where political systems were responsive to civil society and decentralized governance was functional, adaptation was quicker and more effective. However, in contexts where political bottlenecks and fragmentation dominated, the scope for adaptive resilience was narrowed. This case vividly illustrates that in permacrisis conditions-where disasters intersect with economic, political, and conflict stresses-resilience must be understood as a function of both governance legitimacy and local autonomy.

5. Discussion on the Implications of Living in a Permacrisis Environment

Policy Paralysis and Strategic Fatigue

Living in a state of permacrisis fundamentally undermines the ability of governments and institutions to engage in long-term policy planning and implementation. Constantly shifting from one emergency to the next, political leadership often becomes consumed with immediate crisis management, sidelining strategic reforms and development agendas (OECD, 2023). For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath, many governments shelved climate mitigation plans, postponed infrastructure projects, and diverted resources from long-term education and healthcare reforms to manage the outbreak and its social repercussions (LSE, 2021).

This chronic short-termism leads to a condition described by scholars as “strategic fatigue,” where governance structures become overstretched and reactive rather than proactive (Mazzucato, 2021). It cultivates institutional inertia, eroding citizens' trust in public agencies that fail to deliver consistent progress or structural change. In democracies, this fatigue may also reduce civic engagement as citizens perceive their leaders as ineffective, fostering political cynicism (Freedom House, 2023). Moreover, the perpetual emergency mode weakens institutional learning. Lessons from past crises are often unheeded, as new disruptions constantly reset the policy agenda (Wegrich, 2021). For example, despite lessons from SARS and H1N1, many countries were unprepared for COVID-19, and now face similar blind spots in preparing for future pandemics or climate-induced displacement. This cycle stifles adaptive resilience and reduces systemic agility. Finally, international cooperation suffers as states turn inward to manage their own compounding crises. Multilateral responses to global issues-such as the refugee crisis, financial regulation, or environmental degradation-are deprioritized in favor of national responses, leading to fragmentation in the global governance system (UNDP, 2022). The result is a fractured international order struggling to forge collective solutions to shared threats.

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

Socioeconomic Inequality and Marginalization

The permacrisis environment intensifies socioeconomic inequalities, disproportionately affecting the poor, marginalized, and precariously employed. Crises like pandemics, climate disasters, and wars often disrupt livelihoods and public services most vital to vulnerable groups, entrenching a cycle of poverty and exclusion (World Bank, 2023). In Kenya's arid north, climate shocks have decimated pastoral economies, forcing communities into displacement, while better-resourced regions secure emergency aid and political attention (FAO, 2023). Access to essential services-including healthcare, housing, and education-becomes uneven during permacrisis episodes. During COVID-19, wealthier populations accessed remote education, telemedicine, and private logistics services, while millions in the global south and low-income neighborhoods were left behind (UNESCO, 2021). Recovery programs, where they exist, often replicate these inequalities by failing to reach the most affected due to poor targeting or elite capture (IMF, 2023). Moreover, economic recovery in permacrisis contexts tends to be uneven, benefiting capital owners while increasing precarious labor for the working class. The 2022–2024 inflation wave hit food, energy, and rent hardest-burdens that disproportionately affect low-income households (ILO, 2023). Even temporary relief, such as subsidies or wage support, may be inaccessible for informal workers, further exacerbating structural inequalities.

The long-term implication is a fraying of the social contract. When basic needs remain unmet and the benefits of crisis recovery accrue to elites, trust in government declines, and perceptions of injustice rise (Pew Research Center, 2023). This discontent not only weakens institutional legitimacy but also creates fertile ground for populist and extremist movements, as will be discussed next.

Rise of Extremism and Political Radicalization

Prolonged exposure to systemic disruptions often fuels extremism, scapegoating, and authoritarian tendencies. As institutions appear incapable of managing concurrent crises, public frustration can morph into distrust and radical political shifts. Far-right and populist movements in Europe and Latin America have gained ground by blaming migrants, minorities, or "globalist elites" for economic hardship and cultural instability (Carnegie Endowment, 2024). Historical and recent data show that periods of permacrisis correlate with increases in hate crimes, xenophobic rhetoric, and the erosion of democratic norms. The migration crisis triggered by the Syrian war and the Ukraine invasion, for example, spurred nationalist backlash in host countries, amplifying anti-immigrant sentiment and weakening asylum systems (UNHCR, 2023). Similarly, COVID-19 saw the rise of anti-Asian racism and attacks on health officials fueled by conspiracy theories (WHO, 2022).

The politics of fear that accompany permacrisis often embolden authoritarian leaders. Under the pretext of emergency rule or national survival, such leaders curtail civil liberties, weaken judicial independence, and manipulate electoral processes-leading to what scholars describe as "democratic backsliding" (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). In some contexts, including Hungary, India, and Brazil, such conditions were exacerbated during and after the pandemic (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2024). The rise in extremism also presents a transnational threat. Online radicalization, facilitated by social media, spreads extremist ideologies beyond borders, making it harder for national governments to contain. The interplay of disinformation, economic despair,

and identity politics creates a volatile environment that threatens both domestic and international stability (CSIS, 2023).

Mental Health Epidemics and Social Wellbeing

Perhaps one of the most underappreciated consequences of living in a permacrisis environment is its toll on mental health. The persistence of fear, uncertainty, and loss-whether due to climate disasters, conflict, or disease-has led to a surge in anxiety, depression, burnout, and trauma across societies (WHO, 2022). Unlike singular crises, permacrisis conditions provide no psychological "break," compounding stress and emotional fatigue. Healthcare systems, already stretched by physical illness and budget constraints, are often ill-equipped to deal with the parallel epidemic of mental health disorders. During the pandemic, mental health services were interrupted in over 93% of countries, even as demand skyrocketed (WHO, 2021). In post-conflict zones like Ukraine, psychological trauma among civilians and soldiers has overwhelmed available support systems, leaving long-term scars (UNDP, 2023). Youth and frontline workers are particularly vulnerable. Young people face disrupted education, uncertain job markets, and social isolation, while health workers, humanitarian responders, and teachers face burnout and moral injury (UNICEF, 2023). A generation now comes of age under constant crisis, leading to what some researchers term "pre-traumatic stress" - chronic worry about the future without a defined point of recovery (APA, 2023).

The societal consequences are profound. Mental health crises weaken labor productivity, increase social fragmentation, and reduce civic participation. If left unaddressed, they risk becoming self-perpetuating, as emotionally depleted populations may be less resilient, less trusting, and more susceptible to extremism and misinformation (OECD, 2024). Addressing mental health must therefore become a core pillar of resilience-building in permacrisis governance.

Investing in Public Health and Social Safety Nets

A foundational pillar of adaptive resilience in the age of permacrisis is the robust investment in public health systems and inclusive social safety nets. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the vulnerability of health infrastructure even in high-income countries, leading to millions of preventable deaths and disruptions to routine care (WHO, 2021). Low- and middle-income nations, lacking financial and human resources, suffered disproportionately. A resilient health system must not only be reactive to pandemics but also proactive in preventive care, surveillance, and mental health services (OECD, 2022). Social protection programs-including universal health coverage, unemployment benefits, and food assistance-serve as buffers that prevent vulnerable populations from falling deeper into poverty during crises. Countries with pre-existing strong safety nets, like Norway and South Korea, were able to sustain citizen welfare and economic activity more effectively during COVID-19 (IMF, 2022). These structures also play a stabilizing role in political terms, maintaining trust in government institutions amid social stress. However, the financing of such systems remains a challenge, particularly in the Global South where debt burdens and fiscal constraints limit public spending. Innovative financing mechanisms, including social bonds, carbon taxes, and international solidarity funds, are now being explored to make resilience equitable and sustainable (UNDP, 2023). Additionally, digitization of service delivery through mobile money and health tech platforms has proven effective in reaching underserved communities in countries like Kenya and Bangladesh (GSMA, 2022). Incorporating public health and social safety net expansion into national resilience strategies fosters societal cohesion, builds trust, and reduces the likelihood of civil unrest. It also enhances community capacity to respond to

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

future crises in a decentralized and equitable manner-key attributes in a permacrisis era where state resources are often stretched thin and systemic shocks are increasingly complex.

Building Climate-Resilient Infrastructure

The accelerating pace of climate disruption demands a systemic shift towards climate-resilient infrastructure. As extreme weather events intensify-whether in the form of floods in Pakistan, heatwaves in Europe, or droughts in the Horn of Africa-traditional infrastructure is increasingly inadequate (IPCC, 2023). Resilient infrastructure goes beyond carbon reduction to include adaptive measures such as flood-resistant buildings, drought-tolerant agriculture, and heat-adaptive urban design.

Green infrastructure, including mangrove restoration, permeable pavements, and reforestation, plays a dual role in mitigation and adaptation. These nature-based solutions not only buffer communities from environmental shocks but also create co-benefits such as biodiversity preservation and job creation (UNEP, 2023). In contrast, maladaptive infrastructure-such as overbuilt coastal cities or water-intensive industries in arid zones-amplifies vulnerabilities.

A permacrisis approach to infrastructure must also consider system interdependencies. Energy grids, transportation systems, and water supplies must be designed to withstand cascading failures. For example, the 2021 Texas power grid collapse during a winter storm illustrated how outdated and uncoordinated systems can cause multi-sectoral failures (DOE, 2022). Investments in smart infrastructure and decentralization (e.g., solar microgrids, localized water harvesting) offer greater flexibility and redundancy. Equity in infrastructure development is also vital. Informal settlements, indigenous lands, and rural peripheries are often the least resilient but the most exposed. Targeted investments in these areas, guided by participatory planning and local knowledge, can yield higher resilience dividends than conventional top-down projects (World Bank, 2023). As such, climate-resilient infrastructure is not just a technical issue but a political and ethical imperative in permacrisis governance.

Reforming Global Governance Structures

The current global governance architecture-anchored in 20th-century models like the UN, WTO, and Bretton Woods institutions-has shown considerable strain under the weight of 21st-century permacrises. Multilateral systems are frequently gridlocked, as seen in the UN Security Council's inability to address conflicts like Ukraine or Gaza, and the WTO's paralysis on trade justice (Guterres, 2023). This institutional sclerosis erodes legitimacy and undermines coordinated global responses to cross-border crises.

To address this, scholars and practitioners have called for a rethinking of global governance grounded in polycentric and inclusive models. These would distribute authority across state and non-state actors, allowing for more agile and context-responsive action (Ostrom, 2010; Hale et al., 2021). Climate governance has pioneered such approaches, with coalitions like the Climate Vulnerable Forum and the C40 Cities network showing that decentralized diplomacy can lead to tangible results even in the absence of global consensus. Financial governance reform is equally urgent. The IMF and World Bank are being pushed to shift from austerity-driven models to ones centered on resilience financing, debt relief, and climate adaptation for vulnerable nations (Stiglitz & Rashid, 2023). The Bridgetown Initiative, spearheaded by Barbados, exemplifies new thinking

Stratford Peer Reviewed Journals and Book Publishing
Journal of Strategic Management
Volume 9||Issue 2||Page 92-133 ||August||2025|
Email: info@stratfordjournals.org ISSN: 2616-8472

by advocating for global financial systems that prioritize ecological and social stability over traditional growth metrics.

Yet global governance must also be democratized. Civil society, indigenous communities, and youth movements demand meaningful participation in decision-making spaces traditionally reserved for states and technocrats. As philosopher Bruno Latour (2017) noted, any effective governance in the Anthropocene must engage "the politics of the Earth"-bringing together planetary limits, lived experiences, and cross-sector collaboration. In a permacrisis world, legitimacy, adaptability, and justice must become core design principles of global cooperation.

Strengthening Community-Based Adaptation

Community-based adaptation (CBA) places agency in the hands of local actors, emphasizing context-specific strategies for navigating crises. In the face of state failure or international inaction, communities often become first responders-mobilizing local knowledge, social capital, and informal institutions to address food insecurity, displacement, and disaster response (Ensor et al., 2019). This was evident in the 2023 Turkey-Syria earthquake, where local volunteers and networks filled gaps left by delayed state action (IFRC, 2023).

CBA approaches are diverse, including indigenous farming techniques in drylands, women-led savings groups in flood-prone regions, and community health workers combating disease outbreaks. These strategies thrive on trust, reciprocity, and cultural coherence-attributes often missing in top-down interventions (Reid et al., 2022). In Kenya's arid north, pastoralist communities have developed sophisticated early-warning systems and conflict resolution mechanisms rooted in tradition and negotiated resource-sharing (FAO, 2023). One challenge, however, is scaling up CBA without undermining its local legitimacy. Many donor-driven "participatory" projects merely extract local knowledge without empowering communities, resulting in failed or short-lived outcomes (IPCC, 2022). True resilience requires redistributing power, financing, and decision-making authority to grassroots organizations, cooperatives, and customary governance structures. Strengthening CBA also involves enhancing the enabling environment-providing access to land rights, education, financial services, and digital connectivity. When paired with responsive institutions, CBA becomes a vital component of a multi-level resilience architecture that bridges the gap between national policy and local reality. In a permacrisis context, where state capacity is often uneven, community resilience is not just supplemental-it is essential.

Promoting Transparent and Accountable Leadership

Lastly, adaptive resilience cannot be realized without political leadership that is transparent, accountable, and oriented toward the long term. Crises reveal the quality of governance; they test whether leaders act in the public interest, communicate clearly, and manage resources equitably. In contrast, opaque decision-making and corruption exacerbate crisis impacts, breed mistrust, and reduce compliance with emergency measures (Transparency International, 2023). Effective leadership in a permacrisis environment requires anticipatory governance-an ability to recognize weak signals, plan for contingencies, and course-correct in real time (Muid, 2023). This includes open communication strategies, evidence-based policymaking, and cross-sector collaboration. Leaders like Jacinda Ardern (New Zealand) and Mia Mottley (Barbados) have been lauded for

exemplifying transparent crisis communication and climate advocacy grounded in justice and solidarity.

Moreover, leadership accountability must be institutionalized. Independent oversight bodies, participatory budgeting, and digital transparency tools (e.g., open procurement platforms) enhance public scrutiny and deter mismanagement. Countries like Estonia and Uruguay have led in this regard, using e-governance to increase trust and responsiveness (World Bank, 2022). These tools also allow for citizen engagement in shaping crisis responses. Yet leadership is also a cultural practice-not just a function of office. Cultivating civic leadership at multiple levels-from youth councils to neighborhood associations-builds a distributed leadership ecosystem that can withstand leadership failures at the top. As permacrisis becomes a defining feature of this century, leadership must evolve beyond charisma and electoral success to embody foresight, integrity, and collective stewardship of planetary and human futures.

6. Conclusion

The era of permacrisis challenges the assumptions of linear progress and stability. It demands a new mindset: one that accepts volatility as the norm and focuses on flexibility, equity, and cooperation. While the crises may be permanent, despair need not be. With strategic foresight and collective action, societies can navigate the storm without losing their moral compass or sense of purpose. Permacrisis is not a temporary anomaly but a structural condition of the 21st century, marking a total disruption of previous norms, governance systems, and socio-economic models. It reflects a deep entanglement of ecological collapse, political decay, economic precarity, and epistemic fragmentation. As the boundaries between emergencies blur and new vulnerabilities emerge, the challenge is not merely to manage individual crises but to rethink the foundational paradigms that produce them. This calls for transformative resilience, inclusive governance, and systemic re-imagination of our collective futures. While the disruptions are severe, they also open a space for radical hope and structural change.

The age of permacrisis is not defined solely by the number or severity of individual crises but by the deep entanglement and perpetuation of systemic disruptions across political, economic, social, and ecological domains. This essay has demonstrated that what began as discrete events-the 2008 global financial crisis, the wars in the Middle East, the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change tipping points, and the rise of political populism-has evolved into a chronic condition of compound crisis. Each disruption has reinforced and magnified the others, eroding the legitimacy and resilience of national and global governance structures (Tooze, 2022; IPCC, 2023).

Permacrisis is no longer a hypothetical construct-it defines the contemporary global condition. Its disruptions are not only frequent but fundamentally interconnected, undermining the resilience of existing systems. From climate and pandemics to war and economic volatility, the manifestations of permacrisis demand a shift from linear problem-solving to adaptive and anticipatory governance (Moser & Hart, 2019). Understanding permacrisis requires systems thinking, interdisciplinary approaches, and a new social contract that recognizes our shared vulnerabilities. Without this, the world risks moving from crisis to catastrophe-trapped in a spiral where recovery becomes as difficult as prediction.

Crucially, permacrisis is a governance challenge as much as it is a material one. The failure of governments and institutions to anticipate and adapt to interlocking crises has led to widespread

public disillusionment, democratic backsliding, and policy inertia. From the failure to coordinate a just and equitable pandemic response to the paralysis in climate negotiations, the inability to generate collective global action has become a defining feature of the contemporary crisis landscape (Fukuyama, 2023; WHO, 2024). Governance models built for incremental and linear challenges are no longer sufficient in a world characterized by cascading feedback loops, technological acceleration, and planetary limits.

Moving forward requires a radical rethinking of crisis management, not as a sequence of emergency responses, but as a continuous and anticipatory form of resilience. Adaptive governance frameworks must be designed to function under conditions of uncertainty, complexity, and limited information. This includes investing in foresight institutions, developing multi-level response capacities, and embedding flexibility into legal and policy systems. As Moser and Hart (2019) argue, resilience is not merely the ability to bounce back but the capacity to transform in the face of systemic disruption. Thus, resilience-building must extend beyond infrastructure to include social trust, civic capacity, and institutional adaptability.

Strategically, the way forward involves a reconfiguration of the global social contract. This means bridging the global governance gap by revitalizing multilateralism through more inclusive, transparent, and accountable institutions. It requires taxing the digital economy and regulating AI to manage tech-driven disruptions; establishing a global climate justice fund to address loss and damage; and reinvesting in public goods such as health, education, and ecosystems. Finally, it calls for civic renewal-rebuilding public trust and democratic participation from the ground up. Without such transformations, societies will remain suspended in the logic of permacrisis: perpetually managing emergencies, never solving them.

References

African Union. (2022). *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want*. Addis Ababa: AU Commission.

Ahern, J. (2011). From fail-safe to safe-to-fail: Sustainability and resilience in the new urban world. *Landscape and Urban Planning*, 100(4), 341–343.

Aida, J., Kawachi, I., Subramanian, S. V., & Kondo, K. (2013). Disaster, social capital, and health. In I. Kawachi, S. V. Subramanian, & D. Kim (Eds.), *Social capital and health* (pp. 167–187). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7464-7_9

Alfano, V. (2022). Social capital, trust and compliance with COVID-19 public health measures. *Journal of Public Health Research*, 11(2), 22799036221089403.

Amnesty International. (2021). COVID-19 Crackdowns and State Surveillance. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/

Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 18(4), 543–571.

Azam, M., Khan, A. Q., & Hassan, S. (2021). Do democracy and globalization affect environmental degradation? Empirical evidence from developing countries. *Environmental Science and Pollution Research*, 28(2), 2139–2151.

Barbier, E. B., & Burgess, J. C. (2021). Sustainability and development after COVID-19. *World Development*, 135, 105082.

Bartscher, A. K., Seitz, S., Siegloch, S., Slotwinski, M., & Wehrhöfer, N. (2021). Social capital and the spread of COVID-19: Insights from European countries. CESifo Working Paper No. 8346.

Bättig, M. B., & Bernauer, T. (2009). National institutions and global public goods: Are democracies more cooperative in climate change policy? *International Organization*, 63(2), 281–308.

Beck, U. (1992). *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. Sage.

Beck, U. (2023). *The Metamorphosis of the World*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bennett, W. L., & Livingston, S. (2020). The disinformation age: Politics, technology, and disruptive communication in the United States. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108883035

Berkes, F., & Ross, H. (2013). Community resilience: Toward an integrated approach. *Society & Natural Resources*, 26(1), 5–20.

Bogich, T. L., Funk, S., Malcolm, T. R., Chhun, N., Epstein, J. H., Chmura, A., & Daszak, P. (2012). Preventing pandemics via international development: A systems approach. *PLoS Medicine*, 9(12), e1001354.

Boyd, E., Folke, C., & Nyström, M. (2023). Resilience and Transformation in a Changing World. *Cambridge University Press*.

Bremmer, I. (2023). *The Power of Crisis: How Three Threats – and Our Response – Will Change the World.* Simon & Schuster.

Bridle, J. (2022). *Ways of Being: Beyond Human Intelligence*. Allen Lane.

Brookings Institution. (2023). *Ukraine's digital defense: Resilience and adaptation in wartime*. https://www.brookings.edu

Brookings Institution. (2023). *Weaponizing food and energy: The economic dimensions of the Ukraine war*. https://www.brookings.edu

Bruno Latour. (2017). *Facing Gaia: Eight lectures on the new climatic regime*. Polity Press.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2024). *Polarization and disinformation in the digital age.* https://carnegieendowment.org

Cavalieri, M., & Ferrante, L. (2016). Does fiscal decentralization improve health outcomes? Evidence from Italian regions. *Regional Studies*, 50(10), 1682–1698.

Chandler, D. (2019). *Resilience: The Governance of Complexity*. Routledge.

Chandler, D. (2023). *Resilience in the Anthropocene*. Routledge.

Chandler, D., & Reid, J. (2020). Becoming Indigenous: The rise of the resilience episteme. *Critical Studies on Security*, 8(3), 191–206.

Cheeseman, N. (2022). Authoritarian Africa: Repression, Resistance and the Power of Ideas. *Oxford University Press*.

Choi, J. (2020). Civil society response to COVID-19 in South Korea. *Globalization and Health*, 16(1), 1–5.

Collins Dictionary. (2022). Word of the year: Permacrisis. Retrieved from https://www.collinsdictionary.com/woty

Comfort, L. K., Boin, A., & Demchak, C. C. (2020). Resilience revisited: COVID-19 and the limits of planning. *Public Administration Review*, 80(4), 674–678.

Cramer, E., Smith, L., & Galea, S. (2021). Crisis Fatigue: Psychological Impacts of Prolonged Emergency. *Journal of Health Psychology*, 26(12), 1819–1831. https://doi.org/10.1177/13591053211027586

CSIS. (2023). Strategic fallout of the Ukraine conflict: Implications for NATO and the global order. *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. https://csis.org

Davoudi, S., Brooks, E., & Mehmood, A. (2013). Evolutionary resilience and strategies for climate adaptation. *Planning Practice & Research*, 28(3), 307–322.

Demiroz, F., & Hu, Q. (2014). The role of nonprofit organizations in disaster response: An expanded model of cross-sector collaboration. *Public Management Review*, 16(4), 558–582.

Devi, S. (2020). Resilient Kerala: How decentralisation helped tackle COVID-19. The Lancet, 396(10249), 1121. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)32233-X

Economist Intelligence Unit. (2024*). Democracy Index 2023: Fragile recovery or continuing decline?* https://www.eiu.com

Edelman Trust Barometer. (2024). *Global report*. Edelman. https://www.edelman.com/trust/2024-trust-barometer

Elgar, F. J., Stefaniak, A., & Wohl, M. J. A. (2020). The trouble with trust: Time-series analysis of social capital, income inequality, and COVID-19 deaths in 84 countries. *Social Science & Medicine*, 263, 113365.

Ensor, J., Park, S. E., Attwood, S. J., Kaminski, A. M., & Johnson, J. E. (2019). Can community-based adaptation increase resilience? *Climate and Development*, *11*(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2017.1372265

Escobar, A. (2022). *Pluriversal Politics: The Real and the Possible*. Duke University Press.

European Commission. (2021). *2021 Strategic Foresight Report: The EU's Capacity and Freedom to Act*. Brussels: EC.

FAO. (2023). *Building resilience of pastoralist communities in northern Kenya*. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. https://www.fao.org

FAO. (2023). Drought in the Horn of Africa: Situation update #11. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. https://www.fao.org

Financial Times. (2022). "'*Permacrisis' Is the Word of the Year*." Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/

Folke, C., Biggs, R., Norström, A. V., et al. (2021). "Our Future in the Anthropocene Biosphere." Ambio, 50(4), 834–869.

Folke, C., Biggs, R., Norström, A. V., Reyers, B., & Rockström, J. (2021). Social-ecological resilience and biosphere-based sustainability science. *Ecology and Society*, 26(3), 41. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-12097-260341

Folke, C., Carpenter, S., Walker, B., Scheffer, M., Chapin, T., & Rockström, J. (2022). Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for social–ecological systems analyses. *Global Environmental Change*, *73*, 102457.

Folke, C., et al. (2021). Our future in the Anthropocene biosphere. *Ambio*, 50(4), 834–869.

Forbes Ukraine. (2023). How Ukraine's digital state survived and adapted under fire. https://forbes.ua

Foucault Welles, B. (2024). *Digital Resilience: Designing Publics in the Platform Age*. MIT Press.

Freedom House. (2023). Freedom in the World 2023: Marking 50 years in the struggle for democracy. https://freedomhouse.org

Freedom House. (2024). Freedom in the World Report 2024. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/

Freedom House. (2024). Nations in Transit: Autocracy and Democratic Regression.

Fridell, M., Edwin, J., Pathmanathan, I., & Lavis, J. (2020). Institutional design and health system resilience: A rapid review of the literature. Health Research Policy and Systems, 18(1), 81.

Fukuyama, F. (2022). Liberalism and Its Discontents. Profile Books.

GAVI. (2023). COVAX Report: Global Vaccine Equity Progress and Failures.

Ghosh, J., Kose, M.A., & Sugawara, N. (2022). Multiple Crises and Policy Dilemmas. World Bank.

GoK (Government of Kenya). (2023). *Kenya National Resilience Strategy 2023–2027*. Nairobi: Ministry of Planning.

Gooding, K., Naugle, D., Devine, A., & Siekmans, K. (2022). Enabling systems resilience: The role of international NGOs in supporting health systems during COVID-19 in resource-constrained settings. *Health Policy and Planning*, 37(3), 253–261.

Gostin, L. O., Meier, B. M., & Stocking, B. (2022). "Equity and the global distribution of COVID-19 vaccines." JAMA, 327(13), 1247-1248.

GSMA. (2022). *State of Mobile Internet Connectivity Report 2022*. GSMA Intelligence. https://www.gsma.com

Guterres, A. (2023, September). *Remarks to the UN General Assembly High-Level Week*. United Nations. https://www.un.org

Guzel, B., Arslan, U., & Acaravci, A. (2021). Democracy and globalization: Evidence from panel data analysis. Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, 34(1), 1342–1357.

Habermas, J. (2022). *The Lure of Technocracy: Postdemocratic Drift and the Crisis of Rationality*. Polity.

Hale, T., Held, D., & Young, K. (2021). *Gridlock: Why global cooperation is failing when we need it most*. Polity Press.

Harari, Y. N. (2022). *21 lessons for the 21st century*. Vintage.

Hegele, Y., & Schnabel, J. (2021). Federalism and the management of the COVID-19 crisis: Centralisation, decentralisation and (non-) coordination. *West European Politics*, 44(5–6), 1050–1076.

Hirst, P. (2000). *Democracy and governance. In J. Pierre (Ed.), Debating governance* (pp. 13–35). Oxford University Press.

Hizbaron, D. R., Ruslanjari, D., & Mardiatno, D. (2021). Institutional transformation in disaster risk management: From command and control to collaboration. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, 60, 102287.

Homer-Dixon, T. (2022). *Commanding Hope: The Power We Have to Renew a World in Peril*. Vintage Canada.

House of Commons. (2021). *Coronavirus: Lessons learned to date. UK Parliament*. https://committees.parliament.uk

Human Rights Watch. (2023). *Turkey: Earthquake highlights governance failures.* https://www.hrw.org

ICVA. (2023). *NGO coordination in the response to the Turkey-Syria earthquake. International Council of Voluntary Agencies.* https://www.icvanetwork.org

Ida, J., Kawachi, I., Subramanian, S. V., & Kondo, K. (2013). *Disaster, social capital, and health. In Social capital and health* (pp. 167–187). Springer.

IDB. (2021). Decentralized governance and public service continuity in Uruguay during COVID-19. *Inter-American Development Bank*. https://www.iadb.org

IEA. (2023). *World Energy Outlook 2023. International Energy Agency*. https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2023

ILO. (2022). *Global employment trends for youth 2022: Investing in transforming futures for young people.* International Labour Organization. https://www.ilo.org

ILO. (2023). World Employment and Social Outlook.

IMF. (2022). *World Economic Outlook Update – Gloomy and More Uncertain*. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org

IMF. (2023). *World Economic Outlook: A new age of divergence*. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org

IMF. (2023). World Economic Outlook: A Rocky Recovery. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO

IMF. (2024). Debt Sustainability Framework Update.

Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2016). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge University Press.

International Crisis Group. (2024). Conflict in the Sahel: A Widening Spiral. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/

IOM. (2023). World Migration Report.

IPCC. (2022). *Sixth Assessment Report: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability*. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. https://www.ipcc.ch

IPCC. (2023). *Climate Change 2023: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability*. Sixth Assessment Report.

IPCC. (2023). *Climate Change 2023: Synthesis report. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr

IPCC. (2023). *Sixth Assessment Report (AR6): Climate Change 2023. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/synthesis-report/

Jiménez-Rubio, D. (2011). The impact of decentralization on health outcomes: Evidence from Canada. *Applied Economics*, 43(26), 3907–3917.

Judah, B. (2022). *This Is Europe: The Way We Live Now*. Picador.

Kabat, P., et al. (2016). The Dutch Delta approach. *Environmental Science & Policy*, 55, 152–161.

Kanyinga, K., & Long, J. D. (2023). Electoral Violence and Institutional Fragility in Kenya. *African Affairs*, 122(486), 541–562.

Kapucu, N. (2012). *Social capital and civic engagement. In D. S. Massey (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of urban economics and planning*. Oxford University Press.

Kapucu, N. (2014). Collaborative governance in the aftermath of a disaster: Hurricane Katrina in the USA. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 37(5), 257–270.

Kasdan, D. O. (2022). Institutional resilience and trust in public governance. *Journal of Policy Modeling*, 44(2), 373–387.

Kaufmann, D., & van der Heijden, J. (2023). *Governance for the Future: Designing Resilient Institutions*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Keohane, R. (2023). *Global Governance in a Fragmented World*. Princeton University Press.

Kickbusch, I., Leung, G. M., Bhutta, Z. A., & Matsoso, M. P. (2020). Covid-19: how a pandemic reveals that everything is connected. BMJ, 369.

Kim, J. H., An, J. A., Min, P. K., Bitton, A., & Gawande, A. A. (2021). How South Korea responded to the COVID-19 outbreak in Daegu. *NEJM Catalyst Innovations in Care Delivery*, 2(4). https://doi.org/10.1056/CAT.20.0159

Kim, S., Kim, S., & Kang, S. (2020). South Korea's fast response to COVID-19: Key policies and implications. *Journal of Health Policy and Management*, 30(2), 105–113.

Kuhlmann, E., Brinzac, M. G., & Correia, T. (2021). Health system responses to COVID-19: Decentralization and collaboration in Germany. *Health Policy*, 125(3), 296–302. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2020.11.003

Latour, B. (2017). *Facing Gaia: Eight lectures on the new climatic regime*. Polity Press.

Latour, B. (2021). *After Lockdown: A Metamorphosis*. Polity Press.

Legatum Institute Foundation. (2020). *The Legatum Prosperity Index* 2020. https://www.prosperity.com

Lemieux, T., Milligan, K., Schirle, T., & Skuterud, M. (2022). The COVID-19 pandemic and Canadian labor market outcomes. *Canadian Public Policy*, 48(S1), S72–S88. https://doi.org/10.3138/cpp.2021-104

Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). *How democracies die*. Crown Publishing Group.

Linkov, I., & Trump, B. D. (2019). *The Science and Practice of Resilience*. Springer.

LSE. (2021). Emergency governance and democratic backsliding in pandemic response. *London School of Economics*. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk

LSE. (2021). Emergency powers and democratic integrity during COVID-19. London School of Economics. https://www.lse.ac.uk

Mair, S., et al. (2023). Complex crises and resilience governance. Futures, 146, 102908.

Makridis, C., & Wu, C. (2021). How social capital helps communities weather the COVID-19 pandemic. *PLOS ONE*, 16(1), e0245135.

Malm, A. (2023). *Climate Crisis and Global Capitalism*. Verso.

Mayunga, J. S. (2007). Understanding and applying the concept of community disaster resilience: A capital-based approach. *Summer Academy for Social Vulnerability and Resilience Building*, Munich, Germany.

Mazzucato, M. (2021). *Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism*. Allen Lane.

Mazzucato, M. (2023). The Big Con: How the Consulting Industry Weakens Our Economies. Penguin.

Mazzucato, M., & Collington, R. (2023). *The Big Con: How the Consulting Industry Weakens our Businesses, Infantilizes our Governments and Warps our Economies*. Allen Lane.

McKinsey Global Institute. (2023). *Global resilience report*. McKinsey & Company.

Melore, P. C., & Nel, E. (2020). Urban governance and disaster risk management in small towns: A case study of Zwelisha, South Africa. *Urban Forum*, 31, 305–323.

Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP). (2022). *Nepal COVID-19 Response Report*. Government of Nepal.

Moon, M. J. (2020). Fighting COVID-19 with agility, transparency, and participation: Wicked policy problems and new governance challenges. *Public Administration Review*, 80(4), 651–656.

Moore, J. W. (2023). *Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital*. Verso.

Morin, E. (2023). *Complex Thinking for a Complex World: Reflections on the Crisis of the Planetary Era*. Springer.

Moser, S. C., & Hart, J. A. F. (2019). The Long Arm of Climate Change: Societal Teleconnections. Global Environmental Change, *5*, 48–57.

Muid, A. (2023). Anticipatory governance and adaptive leadership: Planning in a world of permacrisis. *Futures, 147*, 103102. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2023.103102

NASA. (2024). *2023 declared hottest year on record. National Aeronautics and Space Administration*. https://climate.nasa.gov

Ndlovu, V., & Msimanga, A. (2023). Social capital and community disaster resilience in sub-Saharan Africa: Conceptual reflections. Disaster Prevention and Management, 32(2), 151–167.

NDMA. (2023). *Kenya ASAL early warning bulletin: March 2023. National Drought Management Authority*. https://www.ndma.go.ke

Niblett, R. (2022). "Welcome to the Age of Permacrisis." *Chatham House Journal*, 98(4), 22–27.

Norris, F. H., et al. (2008). Community resilience as a metaphor, theory, set of capacities, and strategy for disaster readiness. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, 41(1), 127–150.

Norris, F.H., et al. (2023). "Community Resilience as a Metaphor, Theory, Set of Capacities, and Strategy for Disaster Readiness." *American Journal of Community Psychology*, 71(3–4), 127–150.

Odhiambo, M. (2024). "Kenya's Debt Crisis and Governance Dilemmas." *African Policy Review*, 15(1), 1–15.

OECD. (2021). *COVID-19 and global supply chains: Policy responses to disruptions. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*. https://www.oecd.org

OECD. (2021). The Long Shadow of the Pandemic: Scenarios for a Post-COVID World. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses

OECD. (2022). *Building resilience in uncertain times: OECD economic outlook*. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. https://www.oecd.org

OECD. (2023). Anticipatory Governance: Tools and Institutions. Paris: OECD Publishing.

OECD. (2024). *Economic outlook interim report: Wage-price disconnect and inflation dynamics*. https://www.oecd.org

OED. (2022). *Oxford Word of the Year 2022*. Oxford English Dictionary. https://languages.oup.com/word-of-the-year/

Opiyo, F., Wasonga, O., Nyangito, M., & Schilling, J. (2022). Traditional institutions and adaptive capacity in pastoralist communities of northern Kenya. *Climate and Development*, 14(4), 315–328. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2021.1953458

Ostrom, E. (2010). Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change. *Global Environmental Change*, *20*(4), 550–557. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.07.004

Pahl-Wostl, C., Armitage, D., Bouwen, R., & Dewulf, A. (2023). Transformation towards adaptive governance: Insights from theory and practice. *Ecology and Society*, *28*(1), 12. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-13940-280112

Parsons, M., Glavac, S., Hastings, P., Marshall, G., McGregor, J., McNeill, J., … & Stayner, R. (2016). Top-down assessment of disaster resilience: A conceptual framework using coping and adaptive capacities. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, 19, 1–11.

Parsons, M., Morley, P., Marshall, G. R., & Stayner, R. (2021). Resilience: Lessons from community responses to disasters. *Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies*, 25(1), 39–52.

Paton, D. (2006). *Disaster resilience: Integrating individual, community, institutional, and environmental perspectives*. In D. Paton & D. Johnston (Eds.), Disaster resilience: An integrated approach (pp. 305–318). Charles C. Thomas Publisher.

Pelling, M., et al. (2018). The political economy of resilience. *Progress in Human Geography*, 42(1), 3–27.

Pew Research Center. (2023). *Public trust in government and institutions: Global trends and insights*. https://www.pewresearch.org

Pistor, K. (2023). "The Code of Crisis: How Law Creates and Sustains Risk." *Harvard Law Review*, 136(3), 456–502.

Raworth, K. (2022). *Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st Century Economist*. Chelsea Green.

Reid, H., Chambers, R., & Huq, S. (2022). Community-based adaptation: Towards a resilient future. In S. Huq et al. (Eds.), *Scaling up community-based adaptation to climate change* (pp. 1–18). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003188792

Rey, M. E., & Barkdull, J. (2005). Globalization and democracy: Internationalization and institutional change. *Democratization*, 12(1), 1–21.

Robalino, D. A., Picazo, O. F., & Voetberg, A. (2001). Does fiscal decentralization improve health outcomes? Evidence from a cross-country analysis. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No*. 2565.

Runciman, D. (2020). How Democracy Ends. Profile Books.

Russell, R., Tran, C., Hall, N., & Schipper, E. L. (2021). Collaborative governance and climate resilience: The need for new practice models. *Climate and Development*, 13(7), 579–591.

Sabry, S. (2019). Globalization and governance in the developing world. Third World Quarterly, 40(1), 102–120.

Skidmore, M., & Toya, H. (2013). Natural disaster impacts and fiscal decentralization. *Land Economics*, 89(1), 101–117.

Steffen, W., Rockström, J., Richardson, K., et al. (2018). "Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene." *PNAS*, 115(33), 8252–8259.

Stiglitz, J. E. (2010). Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy. W. W. Norton & Company.

Stiglitz, J. E. (2023). *The price of inequality in a fractured world*. W.W. Norton & Company.

Stiglitz, J. E., & Rashid, H. (2023). *Restructuring the global financial architecture to address climate change and sustainable development*. Columbia University Press.

Straub, A. M., Vellay, V., & Eid, M. (2020). Social capital and trust in global crises: Empirical insights. *Social Indicators Research*, 150, 437–458.

Suk, J. E., & Semenza, J. C. (2011). Future infectious disease threats to Europe. *American Journal of Public Health*, 101(11), 2068–2079.

Sunstein, C. R. (2023). *How Change Happens: Information, Persuasion, and Crisis*. MIT Press.

Taleb, N. N. (2010). *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*. Penguin.

Tangcharoensathien, V., Mills, A., & Palu, T. (2023). Strengthening community action and social networks to combat COVID-19: Experience from Asia. *Global Health Action*, 16(1), 2189783.

Tierney, K. (2014). The Social Roots of Risk: Producing Disasters, Promoting Resilience. Stanford University Press.

Tooze, A. (2021). *Shutdown: How COVID Shook the World's Economy*. Viking.

Tooze, A. (2022). *Shutdown: How Covid Shook the World's Economy*. Allen Lane.

Transparency International. (2023). *Corruption Perceptions Index 2023*. https://www.transparency.org

Tufekci, Z. (2023). Digital Media and Democratic Decline. Columbia University Press

Turianskyi, Y. (2023). *Building African Futures: Reforms for Resilient Governance*. SAIIA Working Paper.

UN News. (2022). Ukraine war triggering global food, energy and financial crises, UN chief warns. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/05/1118252

UN News. (2022). *Ukraine war: Food and energy crisis spreading across the globe. United Nations News.* https://news.un.org

UNCTAD. (2023). *Global debt vulnerabilities: Risks and policy responses in a divided world. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*. https://unctad.org

UNCTAD. (2024). Trade and Development Report: Structural Inequality and Development. Geneva: United Nations.

UNDP. (2023). *Financing the future: Resilience investment strategies for the Global South*. United Nations Development Programme. https://www.undp.org

UNDP. (2023). Human Development Report 2023/2024: *Uncertain Times, Unsettled Lives*. New York: UNDP.

UNDP. (2024). Human Development Report: Building Resilience in an Age of Uncertainty.

UNDP. (2024). *Resilient Futures: Leveraging AI and Local Data for Climate Risk*. UNDP Africa Report.

UNDRR. (2022). Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction. Geneva: UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction.

UNEP. (2023). *State of Finance for Nature: Time to Act*. United Nations Environment Programme. https://www.unep.org

UNEP. (2024). Adaptation gap report 2024: *Underfinanced and underprepared. United Nations Environment Programme*. https://www.unep.org

UNEP. (2024). State of the Environment: Climate Tipping Points and Governance. UNEP. https://www.unep.org/resources/state-environment-2024

UNESCO. (2021). *Education: From disruption to recovery. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*. https://www.unesco.org

UN-Habitat. (2023). Global state of urban housing 2023. United Nations Human Settlements Programme. https://unhabitat.org

UNHCR. (2023). *Ukraine emergency response: Situation update. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*. https://www.unhcr.org

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (2023). *Education in emergencies report*. UNESCO. https://www.unesco.org/en/education-in-emergencies

USAID. (2022). *Decentralization and local governance in Ukraine: Supporting resilience in wartime*. United States Agency for International Development. https://www.usaid.gov

Van Well, L., Schmitt, P., & Lange, S. (2018). Institutional capacities and urban resilience: A case study of disaster recovery in Christchurch. *Urban Studies*, 55(14), 3048–3064.

Varkey, P., Pritchett, T. J., & Brooks, D. (2020). Trust and pandemic outcomes: How civic trust predicts COVID-19 impacts in Asia. Asia-Pacific Journal of Public Health, 32(7), 321–329.

Wainaina, W., & Ndung'u, J. (2024). "Governance Gaps and the Rise of Non-State Actors in Kenya's Marginalized Regions." *African Affairs*, 123(490), 32–57.

Walker, B., & Salt, D. (2012). *Resilience Practice: Building Capacity to Absorb Disturbance and Maintain Function.* Island Press.

Walker, B., & Salt, D. (2020). *Resilience Practice: Building Capacity to Absorb Disturbance and Maintain Function.* Island Press.

Walker, B., et al. (2020). Navigating the Anthropocene: Improving resilience governance. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 45, 61–87.

Walker, B., Holling, C. S., Carpenter, S. R., & Kinzig, A. (2020). *Resilience thinking: Sustaining ecosystems and people in a changing world*. Island Press.

Wang, C. J. (2022). Institutional quality and COVID-19 outcomes: Evidence from global data. *International Journal of Public Health*, 67, 1604457.

Wang, C. J., Ng, C. Y., & Brook, R. H. (2020). Response to COVID-19 in Taiwan: Big data analytics, new technology, and proactive testing. *JAMA*, 323(14), 1341–1342. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.3151

Wardle, C., & Derakhshan, H. (2017). Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework. Council of Europe.

WHO. (2021). *COVID-19 reveals urgent need for resilient health systems*. World Health Organization. https://www.who.int

WHO. (2022). COVID-19 pandemic triggers 25% rise in anxiety and depression worldwide. World Health Organization. https://www.who.int

WHO. (2024). Pandemic Treaty Negotiation Summary.

WMO. (2023). Climate and security nexus: An emerging global challenge. World Meteorological Organization. https://public.wmo.int

World Bank. (2021). World development report 2021: Data for better lives. https://www.worldbank.org

World Bank. (2022). *Digital Government for Development*. https://www.worldbank.org

World Bank. (2023). Global economic prospects: Slow growth, rising risks. https://www.worldbank.org

World Bank. (2023). *Infrastructure for Resilience: Financing and Policy Solutions*. https://www.worldbank.org

World Bank. (2023). *Ukraine rapid damage and needs assessment: February 2022–February 2023 update.* https://www.worldbank.org

World Bank. (2024). Global Economic Prospects Report. World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects

World Economic Forum. (2024). *Global Risks Report 2024*. Geneva: WEF.

Wu, X. (2021). Social capital and compliance with public health directives in the COVID-19 era. *Journal of Asian Public Policy*, 14(3), 333–351.

Zhou, Y., et al. (2021). Pandemic resilience and preparedness: Learning from COVID-19. *Globalization and Health*, 17(1), 1–14.

Zuboff, S. (2019). *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism*. PublicAffairs.

Zuboff, S. (2020). *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism*. PublicAffairs.

Zukowski, A. A. (2014). Disaster resilience and the power of social capital. *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, 32(2), 277–301.