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Abstract

Persistent household poverty in Rwanda's Western Province has increased the need for coordinated, locally grounded, and accountable poverty reduction interventions. Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs) remain important actors in supporting vulnerable households through livelihood assistance, food security initiatives, education support, healthcare-related services, psychosocial care, humanitarian response, savings groups, agricultural inputs, and community mobilisation. However, their contribution depends not only on the existence of programmes, but also on how organisations coordinate planning, share information, identify beneficiaries, refer households, align interventions with district priorities, and follow up implementation. This study determined how coordination mechanisms among FBOs influenced household poverty reduction in Rwanda's Western Province. An interpretivist qualitative case-study design was employed, using semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, observation, and document review involving FBO leaders, programme staff, local government and Joint Action Development Forum (JADF) actors, community leaders, and beneficiary households. Data was analysed thematically through coding, triangulation, cross-actor comparison, attention to negative cases, and interpretive synthesis. Findings revealed that coordination strengthened poverty reduction by improving joint planning, reducing duplication, enhancing beneficiary targeting, supporting referral pathways, and promoting service complementarity. However, weak documentation systems, irregular information sharing, donor-driven reporting, competition for visibility, and limited referral follow-up constrained household-level change. The study concludes that FBO coordination is a governance mechanism through which fragmented interventions can be transformed into more coherent, equitable, and responsive poverty reduction practice.

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Keywords: *Faith-Based Organisations, coordination mechanisms, household poverty reduction, collaborative governance, Rwanda's Western Province*

1.0 Introduction

Household poverty reduction remains a central governance and development concern, particularly in rural communities where poverty is experienced through overlapping deprivations in income, food security, education, healthcare, shelter, livelihood opportunities, social support, and resilience against shocks. In such contexts, poverty is not only an economic condition but also a multidimensional problem requiring coordinated institutional responses. This study approached coordination as a governance mechanism through which FBO interventions were planned, aligned, and translated into household-level support. FBOs occupy a distinctive position in poverty reduction because they combine community embeddedness, moral legitimacy, volunteer networks, and institutional continuity. Their proximity to local communities enables them to identify vulnerable households and mobilise support through religious, social, and community structures. Yet proximity alone is not sufficient. In the absence of coordination, well-intentioned support can remain scattered, uneven, or weakly connected to household needs.

Rwanda's decentralised governance system provides institutional spaces for coordination through mechanisms such as the JADF. The Rwanda Governance Board describes JADF as a multi-stakeholder platform bringing together the public sector, private sector, and civil society to promote citizen participation in decentralised governance and improve service provision. Similarly, Rwanda's Governance and Decentralisation Sector Strategic Plan 2024-2029 emphasises citizen-centred governance and coordinated local development (Ministry of Local Government [MINALOC], 2024; Rwanda Governance Board [RGB], 2024). These frameworks make coordination central to how FBOs and other local actors are expected to contribute to poverty reduction. Despite these governance arrangements, the existence of coordination platforms does not automatically guarantee functional collaboration. The critical issue is whether coordination changes how actors identify households, share information, avoid duplication, complete referrals, and follow up support. This study therefore determined how coordination mechanisms among FBOs influenced household poverty reduction in Rwanda's Western Province.

1.1 Problem Statement

Rwanda has made poverty reduction a national development priority through Vision 2050, decentralised governance, social protection programmes, and district development planning. Recent evidence shows important progress, with the national poverty rate falling from 39.8% in 2017 to 27.4% in 2024 under the updated poverty measurement methodology (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda [NISR], 2025a). However, poverty remains unevenly distributed across regions and household categories. Rwanda's multidimensional poverty evidence also shows that deprivation involves education, health, basic services, and living standards, confirming that household poverty is broader than income alone (NISR, 2025b).

Western Province remains a relevant setting for this inquiry because many households continue to face rural livelihood insecurity, food shortages, dependence on smallholder agriculture, environmental risks, limited economic diversification, and uneven access to basic services. The problem addressed in this study was therefore not the absence of poverty reduction actors. FBOs,

local government institutions, JADF structures, community leaders, and development partners are present in the province and support vulnerable households in different ways.

The problem lay in the uncertain quality and practical effectiveness of coordination among these actors. Where coordination is weak, FBO-led interventions risk becoming fragmented, repetitive, donor-driven, poorly followed up, or more responsive to institutional reporting requirements than to household-level transformation. The study therefore examined whether coordination mechanisms actually shaped beneficiary targeting, service complementarity, referral completion, follow-up, and household access to multidimensional support. By treating coordination as a lived governance practice rather than a formal arrangement, the study addressed a critical gap in understanding how FBO collaboration contributed to household poverty reduction in Rwanda's Western Province.

1.2 Study Objective

The objective of the study was to determine how coordination mechanisms among Faith-Based Organisations influenced household poverty reduction in Rwanda's Western Province.

2.1 Literature Review

2.1.1 Global Perspectives on FBO Coordination and Poverty Reduction

Global scholarship increasingly positions FBOs as important development actors because they combine service delivery with moral legitimacy, social trust, volunteer networks, and durable community presence. The Joint Learning Initiative on Faith and Local Communities (JLI, 2022) and Tomalin (2023) similarly argue that faith actors often reach socially marginalised households through religious institutions, schools, clinics, local volunteers, and humanitarian networks. This evidence explains why FBOs are frequently present where state and market systems are limited. However, it also requires caution: reach and trust do not automatically translate into sustainable poverty reduction unless they are supported by coordination, transparent targeting, referral systems, and accountability.

Compared with many secular non-governmental organisations, FBOs are often credited with stronger community embeddedness and moral authority, while secular development actors may sometimes demonstrate stronger technical reporting systems, professionalised monitoring, and donor compliance mechanisms. This contrast matters because it shows that the comparative advantage of FBOs is not complete by itself. Their proximity to poor households can improve identification of vulnerability, but weak coordination can still produce fragmented interventions. The global literature therefore suggests that FBOs become more effective when religious legitimacy is combined with disciplined governance practices rather than treated as a substitute for them.

A further critique of global FBO literature is that many studies emphasise generosity, compassion, and social capital while paying less attention to the institutional tensions that shape collaboration. Donor reporting, organisational visibility, denominational boundaries, and competition for resources may limit information sharing and joint planning. This study connected that gap to Rwanda's Western Province by examining coordination not as a moral assumption but as a practical governance mechanism through which FBOs either reduce duplication and improve service complementarity or reproduce fragmented poverty reduction.

2.1.2 FBO Coordination in Sub-Saharan Africa

In sub-Saharan Africa, studies generally agree that FBOs complement government poverty reduction through education, health services, emergency relief, food security initiatives, livelihood support, child protection, savings groups, and psychosocial care (Makhubele, 2021; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2023; World Bank, 2024). This agreement is significant because many African households experience poverty as a combination of income insecurity, food shortages, weak access to basic services, and vulnerability to shocks. In such contexts, FBOs are not peripheral actors; they form part of the everyday welfare and development architecture of poor communities.

However, the African literature also reveals a contrast between FBO presence and FBO effectiveness. While FBOs are often locally trusted, their interventions are sometimes constrained by donor dependency, weak data systems, limited monitoring capacity, uneven professional skills, and fragmented implementation. Makhubele (2021) emphasises the value of faith actors in community development, whereas OECD (2023) and the World Bank (2024) point more strongly to the need for coordinated systems, institutional capacity, and accountable partnerships. The contrast shows that the development role of FBOs should not be assessed only by counting activities, but by examining whether those activities are coordinated enough to produce household-level change.

The critique emerging from sub-Saharan African scholarship is that many FBO studies remain descriptive. They explain what faith actors provide but rarely analyse how coordination mechanisms affect targeting, referrals, service complementarity, and follow-up. This limits their explanatory power because multidimensional poverty cannot be reduced through isolated organisational action. This study responded to that limitation by connecting FBO coordination to concrete mechanisms: joint planning, beneficiary mapping, information sharing, JADF participation, referral tracking, and collective learning.

2.1.3 FBOs and Poverty Reduction in Rwanda

Rwanda provides a distinctive governance context because poverty reduction is pursued through decentralised planning, performance-oriented public administration, social protection, community participation, and multi-stakeholder collaboration. NISR (2025a) reports substantial national poverty reduction, while NISR (2025b) frames poverty as multidimensional, involving overlapping deprivations in education, health, basic services, and living standards. These sources jointly show progress and persistence: Rwanda has achieved important poverty reduction gains, but some households and regions remain vulnerable. This contrast justifies closer examination of how local actors, including FBOs, coordinate their interventions.

Local governance literature connects directly to the coordination question. RGB (n.d.) describes JADF as a multi-stakeholder platform intended to bring together public, private, and civil society actors for decentralised participation and improved service delivery. The JADF performance assessment also indicates that the forum was intended to improve harmonisation among development partners and strengthen district-level coordination (RGB, 2024). In principle, this platform creates an institutional space through which FBOs can align projects with district priorities, avoid duplication, and report implementation. In practice, however, the existence of JADF does not guarantee functional coordination. The key issue is whether the platform changes implementation behaviour: whether actors share beneficiary information, follow up referrals, identify uncovered households, and adjust interventions based on collective evidence.

Western Province deepens the relevance of this debate because household poverty there is shaped by rural livelihoods, limited diversification, food insecurity, environmental risks, and uneven access to services. FBOs may be well positioned to reach vulnerable households, but local vulnerability is too complex for scattered assistance. The Rwandan literature therefore needs to move beyond acknowledging the presence of FBOs and examine whether their coordination mechanisms create an integrated poverty reduction pathway.

2.1.4 Coordination Mechanisms and Household Poverty Reduction

Coordination mechanisms are arrangements that enable actors to jointly plan, share information, allocate responsibilities, refer beneficiaries, monitor progress, and learn from implementation. In poverty reduction, these mechanisms matter because resources are scarce and household needs are multiple. Compared with isolated charity, coordinated intervention can reduce duplication, improve fairness in beneficiary selection, connect households to complementary services, and strengthen follow-up. Coordination is therefore not merely administrative; it is distributive because it influences who receives support, what type of support is provided, and whether unmet needs are recognised.

Nevertheless, coordination can also be symbolic. Partner meetings, reports, and platforms may exist without changing how organisations implement projects. Functional coordination requires evidence-based targeting, updated beneficiary information, documented referrals, shared monitoring, and feedback loops. Symbolic coordination, by contrast, produces attendance and reports but leaves households facing fragmented support. This study connected this distinction to the first objective by asking how coordination mechanisms among FBOs actually influenced household poverty reduction in Western Province.

The main critique is that many coordination studies focus on institutional interaction rather than household consequences. They may show that organisations meet, communicate, or participate in platforms, but they do not sufficiently ask whether these interactions reduce exclusion, improve referral completion, or strengthen service complementarity. This study therefore analysed coordination through a household poverty lens. Coordination was considered meaningful only when it improved the fairness, coherence, responsiveness, and continuity of support to vulnerable households.

2.2 Theoretical Review

Collaborative Governance Theory provided the main analytical lens because it explains how public and non-state actors address complex public problems through shared decision-making, trust-building, joint planning, accountability, and collective action (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012). Compared with traditional hierarchical governance, collaborative governance recognises that poverty reduction requires multiple actors whose resources and knowledge are distributed across institutions. However, the theory can be critiqued for sometimes assuming that collaboration is desirable without sufficiently addressing power asymmetries, donor incentives, and symbolic participation. This study applied the theory critically by asking when coordination became operational and when it remained ceremonial.

Network Governance Theory complemented this perspective by explaining how autonomous but interdependent organisations coordinate through formal and informal relationships (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Rhodes, 1997). This theory connects strongly to FBO practice because faith actors operate through church networks, community volunteers, donors, local leaders, JADF structures,

and government relationships. Yet network governance also has limits: networks can reproduce exclusion when information is controlled by powerful actors or when weak documentation prevents follow-up. The study therefore used the theory to examine both the strengths and fragilities of FBO coordination networks.

Multidimensional Poverty Theory added the outcome lens by showing that poverty involves multiple deprivations rather than income shortage alone (Alkire et al., 2024; Sen, 1999). This theory connects the governance process to household realities. If poverty involves education, health, food security, livelihoods, housing, social support, and resilience, then no single FBO can provide a complete solution. Coordination becomes necessary because it links different services around household needs. The study connected poverty theory and governance theory by analysing coordination as the process that translated multidimensional poverty understanding into integrated household support.

3.0 Research Method

The study adopted an interpretivist qualitative case-study design. This design was appropriate because the study sought to understand how coordination operated in practice, how actors interpreted their collaborative relationships, and how coordination shaped household poverty reduction. Unlike a survey design, the purpose was not to measure coordination statistically, but to interpret coordination as a lived governance process embedded in relationships, trust, information flows, institutional routines, and household experiences (Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Denzin & Lincoln, 2018).

Participants were purposively selected because of their direct knowledge of FBO-led poverty reduction and coordination processes in Western Province. The participant categories included FBO leaders and programme managers, local government and JADF actors, community leaders, beneficiary households, focus group participants, and documentary or observational sources. The purpose of this selection was to generate institutional, governance, community, and household perspectives rather than numerical representativeness.

Table 1: Participant and Evidence Coding Scheme

Code	Source represented	Purpose in analysis
FBO-L	FBO leaders/programme managers	Institutional coordination, leadership, planning and resource mobilisation
LG-JADF	Local government and JADF actors	Formal coordination, policy alignment, partner mapping and monitoring
CL	Community leaders	Local mobilisation, beneficiary verification and community accountability
BEN/FGD	Beneficiary households and focus groups	Household experiences, fairness, perceived change and unmet needs
DOC/OBS	Documents and observation notes	Verification of plans, reports, activities and coordination practices

Data was collected using semi-structured interview guides, focus group discussion guides, observation guides, and document review checklists. The tools explored joint planning, beneficiary identification, information sharing, referral systems, JADF participation, programme alignment, service complementarity, duplication, follow-up, and perceived household poverty reduction

outcomes. The use of multiple tools reflected the qualitative need to compare what actors said, what documents recorded, and what field observations suggested. Interviews were conducted with FBO leaders, programme staff, local government actors, JADF representatives, and community leaders. Focus group discussions captured collective beneficiary experiences of fairness, access, support continuity, and gaps. Observation was used to examine implementation contexts, while document review examined work plans, meeting records, beneficiary lists, reports, and monitoring evidence. This combination helped avoid treating interviews as the only source of truth.

Data was analysed thematically through a transparent evidence-to-theme process. Interview and focus group Data was transcribed, cleaned, anonymised, and organised by participant category. Deductive codes were derived from the conceptual framework, especially coordination mechanisms, while inductive codes captured issues emerging from participants, including competition for visibility, informal referrals, weak documentation, and symbolic coordination. Themes were verified through recurrence across actor categories, consistency across sources, relevance to the research question, and explanatory strength.

The analysis was deliberately interpretive rather than merely descriptive. Participant quotations were used as evidence of meaning and practice, not as decoration. A finding was treated as strong when it appeared across multiple participant categories or was supported by documents, observation, or a clear negative case. This analytical logic strengthened the credibility of claims about how coordination shaped household poverty reduction.

Credibility was enhanced through methodological triangulation, cross-actor comparison, thick description, member reflection, and attention to negative cases. Triangulation compared interviews, focus group discussions, observation notes, and documents. Cross-actor analysis compared evidence from FBOs, local government, JADF actors, community leaders, and beneficiaries. Dependability was strengthened through a visible coding process, while confirmability was supported by linking themes to participant evidence and documentary records.

The study observed informed consent, voluntary participation, confidentiality, anonymity, and secure data handling. Participants were informed about the academic purpose of the research and their right to withdraw. Identifiers were replaced with codes such as FBO-L, LG-JADF, CL, BEN, FGD, and DOC/OBS to protect participants while preserving analytical traceability.

4.0 Findings and Discussion

The findings are presented thematically by linking evidence, interpretation, and analytical meaning under coordination-related subheadings. The purpose is not simply to list what FBOs did, but to show how coordination practices shaped fairness, complementarity, referral, follow-up, and household-level poverty reduction.

Joint Planning as an Equity-Enhancing Mechanism

Joint planning emerged as one of the most important mechanisms through which FBO coordination influenced household poverty reduction. It enabled actors to identify where support was concentrated, where gaps remained, and which households required priority attention. A programme coordinator explained: “When organisations plan together, it becomes easier to know which households have already received support and which families are still in need” (FBO-L, Interview). The quotation frames joint planning not simply as a meeting activity, but as a mechanism for distributive fairness.

Joint planning helped reduce the tendency for support to follow visibility rather than vulnerability. In many poverty contexts, households already known to religious leaders, local authorities, or previous projects may be more likely to receive repeated support. Joint planning challenged this pattern by making coverage gaps more visible. However, the evidence also showed that planning was effective only when it shaped actual implementation decisions. Where meetings ended without responsibility allocation, timelines, or follow-up, joint planning risked becoming symbolic rather than transformative.

Information Sharing as a Governance Resource

Information sharing functioned as both a technical and ethical mechanism. Technically, it allowed actors to compare beneficiary lists, project locations, resources, and unmet needs. Ethically, it reduced the likelihood that support would benefit only visible or connected households while excluding vulnerable households with weaker social access. FBOs exchanged information through formal reports, coordination meetings, phone communication, WhatsApp groups, beneficiary lists, monitoring visits, church networks, and informal community channels.

The deeper interpretation was that information itself became a poverty reduction resource. When actors knew who had been supported, which households remained excluded, and which partner could provide complementary assistance, support was more likely to reach households with clearly identified needs. A local government participant noted that “shared information helped us see which families were not yet reached and which partner could respond” (LG-JADF, Interview). Yet information sharing was constrained by weak documentation systems, donor reporting requirements, competition for visibility, institutional self-protection, and limited trust.

Shared Beneficiary Identification and Targeting Fairness

Shared beneficiary identification strengthened the fairness of FBO-led support. By working with community leaders, local government actors, and JADF structures, FBOs were better able to identify households affected by food insecurity, poor housing, low income, limited school support, weak healthcare access, and livelihood insecurity. One JADF actor observed that sharing beneficiary lists made it easier to identify households that had been missed and to refer them to the right partner (LG-JADF, Interview).

This finding matters because beneficiary targeting is where collaborative governance becomes visible to households. If targeting is weak, coordination remains an institutional claim rather than a household benefit. Shared identification improved inclusion by reducing the risk that support would be concentrated among households already known to organisations. Nevertheless, targeting remained limited where beneficiary lists were not updated, where organisations were reluctant to share data, or where donor conditions restricted information exchange.

Referral Systems as Household-Level Coordination

Referral systems represented the most direct household-level expression of coordination. Since poverty in Western Province is multidimensional, one household may simultaneously require food assistance, school support, health insurance, counselling, agricultural inputs, savings group membership, and livelihood training. Referral systems allowed FBOs to move beyond their own institutional mandates and connect households to support that another actor could provide.

The analytical significance was that referral converted organisational limitation into network strength. A beneficiary participant explained that “one organisation could not solve everything, but when they connected us to another group, the support became more useful” (BEN/FGD, Focus

Group). However, referral systems were only effective when they were documented and followed up. Referral without feedback risked becoming an administrative displacement of responsibility rather than a solution to vulnerability.

JADF Participation and the Limits of Formal Platforms

JADF and local government structures provided an important formal arena for coordination. Through these platforms, FBOs presented plans, reported activities, aligned interventions with district priorities, and engaged with other development actors. A local government actor observed that JADF helped the district know “what each partner was doing and where support was still needed” (LG-JADF, Interview). This confirms that FBO coordination in Western Province is embedded within Rwanda’s decentralised governance framework. However, the findings caution against equating platform existence with platform effectiveness. JADF contributed to poverty reduction where it produced concrete action points, shared information, referral decisions, partner mapping, and follow-up. It was weaker where it functioned mainly as a reporting forum. The issue is therefore not whether FBOs attended JADF, but whether JADF participation changed implementation behaviour.

Coordination, Service Complementarity and Reduced Fragmentation

Coordination influenced poverty reduction by improving service complementarity. Different FBOs possessed different mandates and capacities: some focused on food security, others on school support, health, psychosocial services, savings groups, livelihood training, or humanitarian assistance. Coordination created the possibility that these interventions could support households in a connected way rather than as isolated acts of charity.

This finding supported Multidimensional Poverty Theory because household vulnerability requires more than a single intervention. It also extended Collaborative Governance Theory by showing that collaboration is valuable when it produces complementarity. The strongest evidence of coordination was not the number of meetings attended, but the extent to which scattered organisational activity became a shared evidence base for targeting, referral, and follow-up.

Table 2: Interpretive Matrix of Coordination Mechanisms

Mechanism	Operational meaning	Contribution to poverty reduction	Main limitation
Joint planning	Shared prioritisation and role allocation	Reduced duplication and improved targeting	Weak follow-up after meetings
Information sharing	Exchange of beneficiary and project information	Exposed gaps and improved fairness	Weak data systems and donor visibility concerns
Shared targeting	Community and partner verification of beneficiaries	Reduced exclusion of less visible households	Incomplete or outdated beneficiary lists
Referral systems	Linking households to complementary actors	Addressed multidimensional needs	Undocumented or unfollowed referrals
JADF participation	Formal alignment with decentralised governance	Connected FBO work to district priorities	Risk of symbolic reporting



Figure 1: Conceptual pathway linking FBO coordination mechanisms to household poverty reduction outcomes.

5.0 Conclusion

The central contribution of the study was conceptual and practical: coordination should not be treated as meeting attendance or partner reporting, but as a governance mechanism that links institutional alignment to distributive fairness and household wellbeing. The findings extended collaborative governance debates by showing that coordination matters when it changes implementation behaviour, not when it merely confirms that actors are present in the same institutional space.

The findings supported Collaborative Governance Theory by showing that poverty reduction required more than the independent effort of individual FBOs. It required shared planning, information exchange, trust, referral, and accountability among FBOs, JADF actors, local government, community leaders, and beneficiaries. Yet the findings also refined the theory by showing that collaboration was conditional. Formal platforms such as JADF were necessary, but they were insufficient unless supported by follow-up, documentation, leadership, and willingness to share information.

The findings also supported Network Governance Theory. FBOs operated through both formal and informal networks, including JADF structures, churches, community leaders, beneficiary lists, WhatsApp groups, donor systems, and monitoring visits. These networks helped actors exchange information and connect households to services. However, network effectiveness depended on trust and institutionalisation. Where coordination relied only on personal relationships, staff changes or organisational competition weakened continuity.

The study further supported Multidimensional Poverty Theory because coordination was most valuable where households had multiple overlapping needs. Referral systems, service complementarity, and shared targeting helped address the layered nature of poverty. In this sense, coordination translated multidimensional poverty analysis into practical action: no single actor had to solve all household needs, but actors had to be connected enough to create an integrated response.

The qualitative evidence also revealed tensions. FBOs are morally motivated and locally trusted, but they are also organisations operating within donor reporting systems, resource competition, institutional boundaries, and visibility pressures. This duality explains why coordination was promising but uneven. FBOs had access to households and community trust, yet trust alone did not guarantee data sharing, referral completion, or collective monitoring.

Coordination mechanisms contributed to household poverty reduction in Rwanda's Western Province when they moved beyond formal interaction to practical collaboration. Joint planning improved priority setting; information sharing improved targeting; shared beneficiary

identification reduced exclusion; referral systems connected households to complementary services; and JADF participation linked FBO action to decentralised governance. However, coordination weakened where meetings were not followed by action, beneficiary data remained fragmented, referral systems were not tracked, and donor visibility discouraged information sharing. Sustainable household poverty reduction therefore requires coordination that is documented, followed up, locally accountable, and connected to household-level outcomes.

6.0 Recommendations

FBOs and local government should strengthen joint planning as an implementation tool rather than a meeting routine. Planning meetings should produce clear action points, responsible actors, timelines, resource commitments, and follow-up mechanisms. Shared beneficiary mapping should also be institutionalised through updated beneficiary lists, partner coverage maps, and data protection protocols that allow responsible information sharing without violating confidentiality.

Referral systems should be documented through referral forms, registers, and feedback mechanisms. FBOs should not only refer households but also verify whether referred households actually received support. JADF should be strengthened as a coordination and monitoring platform rather than only a reporting forum. Donors should encourage collective impact reporting to reduce competition for visibility and promote collaboration among FBOs.

Finally, FBOs should invest in coordination capacity, including data management, monitoring and evaluation, documentation, partner mapping, and learning systems. Local government and FBO umbrella structures should facilitate peer learning among larger and smaller FBOs so that less-resourced organisations participate meaningfully in coordination spaces. Future studies should compare coordination mechanisms across provinces or examine how accountability, capacity, and resources interact with coordination to shape household poverty outcomes.

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