United States Financial Sanctions and the Sustainability of Dollar Power: A Literature Based Study of Economic Statecraft
Abstract
This study examines the effectiveness and long term sustainability of United States financial sanctions as an instrument of economic statecraft. The study addresses the disagreement between research that questions sanctions effectiveness and scholarship showing that coercive threats, coalition support, target institutions, and financial network position can improve outcomes. A literature based design was used to synthesize peer reviewed studies and academic books indexed in Google Scholar. The findings show that United States financial power is strengthened by the central position of the dollar and related financial networks, but sanctions effectiveness remains conditional on bargaining conditions, multilateral cooperation, target vulnerability, and third party behavior. The literature also indicates that repeated financial coercion can encourage reserve diversification and alternative payment arrangements. The study concludes that United States sanctions should be selective, coordinated with major partners, linked to clear diplomatic objectives, and accompanied by relief conditions to protect long term coercive capacity.
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